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In recent years, the scientific study of meditation and psychedelic drugs has
seen remarkable developments. The increased focus on meditation in cognitive
neuroscience has led to a cross-cultural classification of standard meditation
styles validated by functional and structural neuroanatomical data. Meanwhile, the
renaissance of psychedelic research has shed light on the neurophysiology of
altered states of consciousness induced by classical psychedelics, such as psilocybin
and LSD, whose effects are mainly mediated by agonism of serotonin receptors.
Few attempts have been made at bridging these two domains of inquiry, despite
intriguing evidence of overlap between the phenomenology and neurophysiology
of meditation practice and psychedelic states. In particular, many contemplative
traditions explicitly aim at dissolving the sense of self by eliciting altered states
of consciousness through meditation, while classical psychedelics are known to
produce significant disruptions of self-consciousness, a phenomenon known as
drug-induced ego dissolution. In this article, we discuss available evidence regarding
convergences and differences between phenomenological and neurophysiological
data on meditation practice and psychedelic drug-induced states, with a particular
emphasis on alterations of self-experience. While both meditation and psychedelics
may disrupt self-consciousness and underlying neural processes, we emphasize
that neither meditation nor psychedelic states can be conceived as simple, uniform
categories. Moreover, we suggest that there are important phenomenological differences
even between conscious states described as experiences of self-loss. As a result,
we propose that self-consciousness may be best construed as a multidimensional
construct, and that “self-loss,” far from being an unequivocal phenomenon, can
take several forms. Indeed, various aspects of self-consciousness, including narrative
aspects linked to autobiographical memory, self-related thoughts and mental time
travel, and embodied aspects rooted in multisensory processes, may be differently
affected by psychedelics and meditation practices. Finally, we consider long-term
outcomes of experiences of self-loss induced by meditation and psychedelics on
Millière et al. Psychedelics, Meditation, and Self-Consciousness
individual traits and prosocial behavior. We call for caution regarding the problematic
conflation of temporary states of self-loss with “selflessness” as a behavioral or
social trait, although there is preliminary evidence that correlations between short-term
experiences of self-loss and long-term trait alterations may exist.
Keywords: psychedelics, meditation, self-consciousness, consciousness, bodily self-consciousness,
autobiographical memory, mind wandering, mental time travel
INTRODUCTION
The scientific study of meditation and psychedelic drugs has
seen remarkable developments in recent years. The increased
focus on meditation in cognitive neuroscience has led to
a cross-cultural classification of standard meditation styles
validated by functional and structural neuroanatomical data
(Lutz et al., 2008; Dahl et al., 2015; Fox et al., 2016). Meanwhile,
the renaissance of psychedelic research (Carhart-Harris and
Goodwin, 2017) has shed light on the neurophysiology of altered
states of consciousness induced by classical hallucinogens, such
as psilocybin and LSD, whose effects are mainly mediated by
agonism of serotonin receptors, and the serotonin 2A receptor
subtype specifically (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012, 2016b; Nichols,
2016). However, few attempts have been made at bridging these
two domains of inquiry, despite increasing evidence of overlap
between the phenomenology and neurophysiology of meditation
practices and psychedelic states.
In particular, many contemplative traditions explicitly aim
at dissolving the sense of self by eliciting altered states of
consciousness throughmeditation (Austin, 2000; Josipovic, 2010;
Vago and Silbersweig, 2012; Dahl et al., 2015), while classical
psychedelics are known to produce significant disruptions of
self-consciousness1, a phenomenon known as “drug-induced ego
dissolution” (Millière, 2017; Nour and Carhart-Harris, 2017;
DIED). In this article, we discuss available evidence regarding
convergences and differences between phenomenological and
neurophysiological data on meditation practice and psychedelic
drug-induced states, with a particular emphasis on alterations
of self-experience. While both meditation and psychedelics are
suspected to disrupt self-consciousness and its underlying neural
processes, this general hypothesis requires careful qualification.
First, it is important to emphasize right away that neither
meditation nor psychedelic states can be conceived as simple,
uniform categories. Many variables modulate the subjective
effects of contemplative practice and psychedelics, including the
style of meditation or the drug and dosage used, as well as
personal factors such as level of experience and personality traits.
In particular, dramatic disruptions of self-consciousness seem
to occur mostly for highly experienced meditators or with high
doses of psychedelics. Thus, we suggest that both meditation
and psychedelics can induce a wide variety of global states of
consciousness, but these states are sensitive to a multitude of
1By “self-consciousness,” we refer in this article to a subject’s consciousness of
themselves – also called “sense of self,” “self-awareness,” “phenomenal selfhood,”
or “self-experience.” Importantly, “self-consciousness” does not refer here to the
social awareness of being the object of the observation of others.
factors in addition to the specific inducers we are highlighting
here2.
In addition, we suggest that there are important
phenomenological differences even between conscious states
described as experiences of self-loss. As a result, we propose that
self-consciousness may be best construed as a multidimensional
construct, and that “self-loss” or “ego dissolution,” far from being
an unequivocal phenomenon, can take several forms. Indeed,
various aspects of self-consciousness, including narrative aspects
linked to autobiographical memory, self-related thoughts and
mental time travel, and embodied aspects rooted in multisensory
processes, may be differently affected by psychedelics and
meditation practices. It is also worth acknowledging that “self-
loss” or “ego dissolution” may be a non-linear phenomenon that
only occurs after a critical inflection point has been reached.
Finally, we consider long-term outcomes of experiences of
self-loss induced by meditation and psychedelics on individual
traits and prosocial behavior. We call for caution regarding
the problematic conflation of temporary states of self-loss with
“selflessness” as a personal or social trait, although it remains
possible that correlations exist between short-term experiences
and long-term dispositions in this regard.
THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MEDITATION
AND PSYCHEDELICS: AN OVERVIEW
Meditation refers to a set of cognitive training techniques and
practices that aim to monitor and regulate attention, perception,
emotion and homeostasis (e.g., breathing rate) (Fox and Cahn,
forthcoming; Tang et al., 2015). Such techniques and practices
have been developed in many different cultures and spiritual
traditions, yielding more than a 100 varieties of meditation.
Most scientific research on the topic has focused on techniques
originating in the Buddhist tradition from China, Tibet, India
and Southeast Asia, with a particular focus on practices often
subsumed under the loose category of mindfulness meditation
(see Box 1; on the limitations of the notion of mindfulness, see
Dam et al., 2018). Nonetheless, there are a growing number
of studies on meditative practices from other contemplative
2From a methodological perspective, disruptions of self-consciousness induced
by meditation might be more challenging in terms of laboratory production,
while disruptions of self-consciousness following the administration of psychedelic
drugs might be more strictly dose-dependent and therefore easier to produce
in a controlled setting. In a similar vein, the choice of baseline conditions and
control groups is a multi-faceted issue in meditation research, often limiting
interpretability, whereas placebo-controlled designs are the default for studies
on psychedelics. Nonetheless, true placebo control is difficult to achieve with
psychedelics, given their vivid and characteristic subjective effects.
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BOX 1 | Glossary.
Drug-induced Ego Dissolution (DIED). A family of acute effects produced by high doses of psychedelic drugs, typically reported as a loss of one’s sense of self
and self-world boundary.
Focused Attention (FA). A common style of meditation that involves sustaining one’s attentional focus on a particular object, either internal (e.g., breathing) or
external (e.g., a candle flame). The practitioner is instructed to monitor their attention, notice episodes of distraction (mind-wandering), and bring their attention back
to the object. FA is usually the starting point for novice meditators.
Loving-Kindness Meditation (LK). A common style of meditation that focuses on developing compassion and love for oneself and others, gradually extending
the focus of empathy to foreign and disliked individuals or even all living-beings. While loving-kindness meditation incorporates technical elements from FA and open
monitoring (OM, defined below), it has a distinct phenomenology and neural correlates due to its emotional content.
Mantra Recitation (MR). A style of meditation that involves repeating a sound, word or sentence, either aloud or in one’s mind, in order to calm the mind and
avoid mind-wandering. Although MR is arguably a form of Focused Attention meditation, it is distinguished by its speech component and may have distinct neural
correlates.
Meta-Awareness. The ability to take note of the content of one’s current mental state. In the context of meditative practices, meta-awareness often refers
specifically to the meditator’s awareness of episodes of mind-wandering (spontaneous thoughts arising during meditation).
MindfulnessMeditation. A group of practices aimed at cultivating mindfulness, typically defined as a state of non-judgmental awareness to one’s present moment
experience. Mindfulness meditation may refer to both focused attention (FA) and open monitoring (OM) practices.
Non-Dual Awareness (NDA). In many contemplative traditions (including Advaita Vedanta and Kashmiri Shaivismwithin Hinduism, and Dzogchen andMaha¯mudra¯
within Buddhism), the practice of meditation aims at recognizing the illusory nature of the subject-object dichotomy that allegedly structures ordinary conscious
experience, thus revealing the “non-dual awareness” that lies at the background of consciousness.
Open Monitoring (OM). A common style of meditation that aims at bringing attention to the present moment and openly observing mental contents without
getting caught up in focusing on any of them. Open monitoring meditation traditionally follows focused awareness, as the practitioner learns to switch from a narrow
attentional focus on an object to a global awareness of the present moment.
Psychedelic Drugs. A family of psychoactive compounds whose complex effects on the quality of conscious experience are mainly mediated by their action
on serotonin receptors in the brain (and specifically their binding to and stimulation of serotonin 2A receptor subtype). Psychedelic substances include mescaline,
psilocybin (so-called “magic mushrooms”), Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD), N,N-Dimethyltryptamine (DMT), and the DMT-containing brew Ayahuasca.
Pure Consciousness (PC). A state of consciousness described as “objectless” or entirely devoid of phenomenal content. While the possibility of such states is
very controversial, certain conscious states induced by some meditative practices and classical psychedelics might lack at least ordinary phenomenal content. In the
Hindu and Buddhist traditions, the practice of Samadhi is often described as leading to the experience of PC.
traditions – including yogic, Hindu, Christian, Sufi, shamanic
and transcendental practices.
To address this remarkable diversity of traditions, researchers
have also sought to categorize the main styles of meditation
across cultural, geographical and historical contexts, based
on the core goals and principles of the mental techniques
involved (Lutz et al., 2008; Travis and Shear, 2010; Nash
and Newberg, 2013). Common styles of meditation include
focused attention meditation (FA)—which requires sustaining
one’s attention on a particular object or sensation such as the
breath—, open monitoring meditation (OM)—which involves
a non-judgmental, non-selective awareness of the present
moment—, loving-kindness and compassion meditation (LK)—
which involves the cultivation of compassion toward oneself
and others—, and mantra recitation (MR)—which involves
the repetition of a sound, word or sentence (see Box 1).
The subjective effects of meditation are multifaceted, including
enhanced attention and sensory processing (Brown, 1977; Jha
et al., 2007), largely positive emotions and mood (Ortner et al.,
2007; Davidson and Lutz, 2008; Lutz et al., 2008), increased
cognitive flexibility and creativity (Horan, 2009; Capurso et al.,
2014; Ding et al., 2014; Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2017), and,
in some cases (usually with increasing expertise) dramatic
disruptions of one’s sense of self (Austin, 2006; Dorjee, 2016;
Berkovich-Ohana and Wittmann, 2017).
Classic psychedelics, also known as classic hallucinogens, are
a family of psychoactive substances that exert their subjective
effects primarily by agonism (or partial agonism) of serotonin
2A (5-HT2A) receptors (Halberstadt, 2015; Nichols, 2016).
Psychedelics include molecules found in the natural world such
as psilocybin (a prodrug of psilocin found in so-called “magic
mushrooms”), mescaline (found in various South American
cacti, including Peyote, San Pedro and Peruvian torch), N,N-
Dimethyltryptamine (DMT, found in many plants such as
Mimosa tenuiflora, Diplopterys cabrerana, and Psychotria viridis,
and used in combination with monoamine oxidase inhibitors
in the shamanic brew Ayahuasca) and 5-MeO-DMT (found in
the toxin of the toad Bufo alvarius, as well as a wide variety
of plants such as Anadenanthera peregrina used in yopo snuff).
Psychedelics also include many synthetic compounds, such as
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and phenethylamines of the
2C-x family (e.g., 2C-B). The subjective effects of psychedelics
are complex and multifaceted, including visual and auditory
distortions and complex closed-eye “visions,” profound changes
in emotions and mood, heightened sensitivity to internal and
external context, and at higher doses, dramatic alterations of self-
consciousness known as drug-induced ego dissolution (DIED)
(Strassman et al., 1994; Vollenweider et al., 1998; Studerus et al.,
2011; Carhart-Harris et al., 2012, 2016b; Schmid et al., 2015; Fox
et al., 2016; Millière, 2017).
Neural Correlates of Meditative Practices
Over the past 20 years, a large number of neuroimaging studies
have investigated various styles of meditation, using electro-
encephalography (EEG), functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) to measure
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changes in blood flow and electrical activity in the brain
during meditation. This research program seeking to isolate
the neural correlates of various meditation practices has come
to be known as contemplative neuroscience. Interestingly, the
wealth of data collected from these studies has begun to reveal
that meditation practices from distinct traditions relying on
similar mental techniques, also share some common neural
correlates. A recent meta-analysis of 78 functional neuroimaging
studies of meditation found dissociable patterns of activation
and deactivation for four common styles of meditation: focused
attention (FA), mantra recitation (MR), open monitoring (OM),
and loving-kindness meditation (LK) (Fox et al., 2016; see
Table 1).
FA was correlated with significant activation clusters in
executive brain areas such as the premotor cortex and the
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, which may underlie top-
down regulation of attention and monitoring of spontaneous
thoughts. FA was also correlated with the deactivation of
two important hubs of the so-called default-mode network
(DMN) namely, the posterior cingulate cortex and inferior
parietal lobule, involved in a plethora of introspection-
related functions including self-reflection, mind-wandering,
autobiographical memory recollection, mental time travel to
the future and imagination more broadly. The main clusters of
activation for MR were found in the motor control network
(Broca’s area, premotor cortex and supplementary motor cortex)
and the putamen. The involvement of these regions in speech
production and attention regulation is consistent with the
practice of mantra recitation, which relies on the constant
repetition of a phrase either in one’s mind or out loud. MR
was also associated with a significant deactivation cluster in the
anterior insula, suggesting that the focus on a repeated phrase is
linked to decreased awareness of bodily sensation.
By contrast, OM was found to be correlated with activation
clusters in the insular cortex, involved in awareness of
interoceptive signals, as well as in brain regions associated with
the voluntary control of thought and action, such as the left
inferior frontal gyrus, the pre-supplementary and supplementary
motor areas, and the premotor cortex. OM was also associated
with the deactivation of the right thalamus, a region involved
in filtering out sensory stimuli (sensory gating), suggesting that
TABLE 1 | Significant clusters of activation/deactivation in four common
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the increased focus of awareness during OM is mediated by
decreased sensory gating. Finally, significant activation clusters
for LK were found in the right somatosensory cortices, the
inferior parietal lobule and the right anterior insula, while no
significant deactivation cluster was found. Although these four
meditation styles are clearly dissociated by their neural correlates,
Fox and colleagues found a few recurrent patterns of activity
modulation, in particular in the insular cortex, an important
multisensory area heavily involved in interoceptive awareness
(Craig, 2002; Simmons et al., 2013).
It is worth noting that distinct styles of meditation were
found to modulate the activity of the insula in different ways,
namely activation for FA, OM, and LK, and deactivation
for MR. Nonetheless, the involvement of the insula in all
four styles of meditation points toward the central role of
the attentional control of bodily awareness, and awareness of
breathing in particular, during various contemplative practices.
Other convergent patterns of activity were found to a lesser extent
in regions involved in the regulation of attention such as the
premotor cortex, supplementary motor area and dorsal cingulate
cortex (Fox et al., 2016).
Importantly, and albeit not emphasized by Fox et al. (2016),
attenuation of either activity or functional connectivity in the
default mode network (DMN), a large-scale intrinsic network
which is highly active at rest but less active during goal-directed
tasks (Raichle et al., 2001), was shown for MR (Berkovich-Ohana
et al., 2015), and in many studies of mindfulness meditation
(combining FA and OM in different degrees). These studies
reported a decrease of activity in key nodes of the DMN,
particularly in the medial prefrontal cortex (Farb et al., 2007,
2013; Brewer et al., 2011; Scheibner et al., 2017) and in the
posterior cingulate cortex (Brewer et al., 2011; Ives-Deliperi et al.,
2011; Pagnoni, 2012; Brewer and Garrison, 2014; Lutz et al., 2016;
Scheibner et al., 2017), compared to meditation-naïve controls or
within-group resting state (reviewed by Tang et al., 2015). While
DMN deactivation is not specific to mindfulness meditation, it
has been found to be more pronounced during meditation than
during other cognitive tasks (Garrison et al., 2015). Moreover,
several studies reported altered connectivity during different
types of meditation most consistently in association with the
DMN (Tang et al., 2015). Specifically, within-DMN connectivity
was found to be reduced during LK (Garrison et al., 2014).
Neural Correlates of Psychedelic States
Recent years have seen a renaissance of scientific research
on psychedelic drugs, using modern neuroimaging techniques
to gather insight into the neural correlates of their vivid
subjective effects (see dos Santos et al., 2016 for a review).
Early neuroimaging studies using PET and single-photon
emission computed tomography (SPECT) after administration
of psilocybin and mescaline found excitatory effects on frontal
cortical areas, medial temporal lobes and the amygdala (Hermle
et al., 1992; Vollenweider et al., 1997, 1998; Gouzoulis-Mayfrank
et al., 1999). By contrast, recent fMRI of psilocybin and ayahuasca
found significant reductions in activity across many brain areas,
including frontal and temporal cortical regions, as well as hubs
of the DMN (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012; Palhano-Fontes et al.,
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TABLE 2 | Main changes in activity and connectivity in the psychedelic state.
References Psychedelic drug Changes in activity Changes in functional connectivity
Carhart-Harris et al., 2012 Psilocybin ց in ACC, PCC, mPFC and thalamus ց mPFC-PCC connectivity
de Araujo et al., 2012 Ayahuasca ր in primary visual cortex during imagery task
ր cuneus, lingual gyrus, PH, RSC, and
frontopolar cortex
ր DMN-TPN connectivity
Carhart-Harris et al., 2013 Psilocybin ր DMN-TPN connectivity
Roseman et al., 2014 Psilocybin ր between-network connectivity
Tagliazucchi et al., 2014 Psilocybin ր diversity of connectivity motifs in HP-ACC
network
Palhano-Fontes et al., 2015 Ayahuasca ց in mPFC, PCC, precuneus ց PCC-precuneus connectivity
Carhart-Harris et al., 2016b LSD ր in visual cortex (correlating with visual
hallucinations)
ց DMN integrity and PHC-RSC connectivity
Tagliazucchi et al., 2016 LSD ր global connectivity, especially thalamus,
frontoparietal and inferior temporal cortices
Müller et al., 2017 LSD ր thalamocortical connectivity
2015; see Table 2). This apparent discrepancy could be due to the
much greater timescales used by PET/SPECT compared to fMRI
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2012).
Recent fMRI studies also revealed alterations of resting-
state functional connectivity in key nodes of the DMN after
administration of psilocybin (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012, 2013;
Tagliazucchi et al., 2014; Lebedev et al., 2015), ayahuasca
(Palhano-Fontes et al., 2015) and LSD (Carhart-Harris et al.,
2016b; Tagliazucchi et al., 2016; see Table 2). Researchers found
increased integration between cortical regions under ayahuasca
(de Araujo et al., 2012), psilocybin (Carhart-Harris et al., 2013;
Roseman et al., 2014), and LSD (Carhart-Harris et al., 2016b;
Tagliazucchi et al., 2016; Müller et al., 2017). Finally, psilocybin
and LSD were found to produce an enhanced repertoire
of dynamical brain states (Tagliazucchi et al., 2014; Atasoy
et al., 2017) and increased spontaneous MEG signal diversity
(Schartner et al., 2017).
Psychedelic drugs are known to produce short-term, dramatic
effects on self-consciousness, especially at higher doses. This
phenomenon is known as drug-induced ego dissolution (DIED);
it is described a loss of one’s sense of self and self-world
boundaries, together with a concomitant oceanic feeling of
“oneness” or “unity” (Letheby and Gerrans, 2017; Millière,
2017; Nour and Carhart-Harris, 2017). Such effects on self-
consciousness had already been reported in early studies
with mescaline (Mayer-Gross and Stein, 1926; Beringer, 1927;
Guttmann and Maclay, 1937), LSD (Anderson and Rawnsley,
1954; Savage, 1955; Von Mering et al., 1955; Bercel et al., 1956;
Klee, 1963; Sedman and Kenna, 1964; Pahnke and Richards,
1966) and psilocybin (Rümmele and Gnirss, 1961; Pahnke,
1966). Recent studies have sought to investigate the neural
correlates of DIED, using correlations between questionnaire
items and neuroimaging data. The main correlates of DIED,
summarized inTable 3, include increased functional connectivity
between the DMN and a task-positive network (Carhart-Harris
et al., 2013), decreased integrity of the DMN (i.e., decreased
within network correlation of timecourses) (Carhart-Harris et al.,
2016b) and salience network (Lebedev et al., 2015), decreased
TABLE 3 | Neural correlates of drug-induced ego dissolution (DIED).
References Drug Correlates of DIED
Carhart-Harris et al.,
2013




Psilocybin ց alpha power in PCC
Lebedev et al., 2015 Psilocybin ց functional connectivity in aPHC
ց MTL-neocortex coupling
ց integrity of salience network
ց interhemispheric connectivity
Tagliazucchi et al., 2016 LSD ր Connectivity density in bilateral
TPJ/angular gyrus and insular cortex
Carhart-Harris et al.,
2016b
LSD ց integrity of DMN
ց PHC-RSC connectivity
ց alpha & delta power in PCC
Lebedev et al., 2016 LSD ր entropic brain activity
Schartner et al., 2017 Psilocybin ր spontaneous MEG signal diversity
(measured with Lempel-Ziv
complexity)
Atasoy et al., 2017 LSD ց mean energy and energy
fluctuations of low frequency
connectome harmonics
connectivity between the parahippocampal and retrosplenial
cortices (Carhart-Harris et al., 2016b), increased entropic brain
activity (Lebedev et al., 2016) and spontaneous MEG signal
diversity (Schartner et al., 2017), and decreased mean energy and
fluctuations of low frequency connectome harmonics (Atasoy
et al., 2017).
ALTERATIONS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
INDUCED BY MEDITATION AND
PSYCHEDELICS
While it is often claimed that meditation and psychedelic
drugs are both able to induce “selfless” states of consciousness,
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that is conscious states entirely lacking a sense of self, this
statement requires qualification. Indeed, “self-loss” and related
expressions such as “ego dissolution” are notoriously ambiguous
notions. Self-consciousness itself may be best construed as a
multidimensional construct including somatosensory, agentive,
narrative and social components (Gallagher, 2000, 2013; Zahavi,
2014; Seth and Friston, 2016). A conscious state in which one of
these aspects is radically disrupted may be described as “selfless”
in one respect, although a subject undergoing such a state
could retain other forms of self-consciousness. Therefore, it is
important to investigate which aspect(s) of self-consciousness
can be disrupted by meditation and psychedelics, and whether
both modes of induction may alter self-consciousness in
similar ways. In addition, there is a further question regarding
the possibility of truly “selfless” states, namely conscious
mental states lacking any kind of self-consciousness. While
some meditative practices and psychedelic drugs have been
hypothesized to produce such “selfless” states, this claim needs
to be supported by an examination of phenomenological reports
in light of the distinction between different aspects of self-
consciousness. In this section, we discuss the ways in which
meditation and psychedelics may disrupt narrative, agentive and
somatosensory aspects of self-consciousness, either in isolation
or in combination. Moreover, we critically examine theoretical
discussions and self-reports about states of “non-dual awareness”
and “pure consciousness” allegedly induced by meditation.
Disruption of Narrative Aspects of
Self-Consciousness
The familiar experience of thinking about oneself is perhaps
the most salient form of self-consciousness. In philosophy of
mind, this is also known as having de se thoughts, namely
thoughts that involve the first-person concept and are naturally
expressed using the first-person pronoun (García-Carpintero,
2015).De se thoughts themselves come in different flavors, which
are more or less egocentric. Thus, one may explicitly reflect on
one’s personality traits or one’s life trajectory, both of which are
important elements of an individual’s identity. This category of
de se thought broadly pertains to the entertainment of core self-
related beliefs, and is often linked to the notion of narrative
selfhood—the stories we tell ourselves about the kind of person
we are or want to be. Admittedly, this kind of de se thought
only occurs sporadically in the waking state, because we are not
constantly reflecting on our personal identity. However, de se
thoughts also include more mundane and pervasive instances
of mind-wandering, such as wondering what one will have
for dinner. Such thoughts also link back to the self, insofar
as they engage the first-person concept, even if they are not
directly related to fundamental beliefs about one’s identity. More
generally, this family of self-referential cognitive content includes
not only de se thoughts about the present moment, but also
autobiographical memory retrieval and self-centeredmental time
travel to the future, both of which also crucially involve the self.
Together, these self-referential mental episodes constitute what
may be called narrative self-consciousness, namely the complex
sequences of self-centered thoughts, memories and imaginings
that weave the narrative of our daily lives and shape our core
self-related beliefs (Damasio, 1999; Gallagher, 2000; Schechtman,
2011).
There are at least two ways in which narrative self-
consciousness may be disrupted. First, the rate of occurrence
of self-referential thought and mental time travel may be
dramatically reduced, or altogether suppressed, during a certain
time interval. There is convincing evidence from experience
sampling studies that mind-wandering and mental time travel
is more ubiquitous in the waking state than we might think,
due to the fact that we are often unaware of such episodes
(Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Killingsworth and Gilbert,
2010; Baird et al., 2011). Moreover, daily mind-wandering
episodes are predominantly future-focused, and frequently
involve the planning and anticipation of personal goals, known
as autobiographical planning (Baird et al., 2011; D’Argembeau,
2016). Thus, it is not exaggerated to say that a large part of
our lives is spent entertaining self-involving thoughts, insofar as
this includes spontaneous de se thoughts about the future. Most
contemplative practices, especially in the Buddhist tradition,
explicitly aim at increasing meta-awareness of mind-wandering,
namely monitoring and taking explicit note of spontaneous
thoughts, in order to disengage from them and re-focus attention
back onto a particular object (such as the breath or a mantra)
or on a wider awareness of the present moment (Hasenkamp,
2018). Once attention has been stabilized and the mind “quieted,”
meditators can undergo prolonged conscious episodes entirely
lacking in self-referential thoughts3.
This is consistent with the neurophysiological basis of
mindfulness meditation reviewed in the previous section. While
key nodes of the DMN such as the mPFC and the PCC are
especially active during mind-wandering (Christoff et al., 2009;
Fox et al., 2015), a number of studies have found that these
regions are deactivated during mindfulness meditation—which
is consistent with the practice’s focus on attentional control
of mind-wandering episodes (Farb et al., 2007; Brewer et al.,
2011; Lutz et al., 2016; Scheibner et al., 2017). Importantly, the
decrease in DMN activity is more significant during meditation
than during other cognitive tasks (Garrison et al., 2015), which
speaks to the crucial issue of specificity and may be characteristic
of the suppression of mind-wandering that can be achieved by
trained meditators. It is also worth noting that experiences of
flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, 1990), namely states of intense
focus in which self-referential processing is inhibited (such as
intense practice in expert athletes or jazz improvisation in expert
musicians), are also associated with decreased activity in the
mPFC (Ulrich et al., 2014). Interestingly, psychedelic drugs have
been shown to decrease activity in the mPFC and PCC as well
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2012; Palhano-Fontes et al., 2015). These
nodes of the DMN have been shown to be more active during
3To be specific, meta-awareness of mind-wandering episodes may crucially involve
de se thought, such as the thoughts “My mind is wandering” or “I need to refocus
my attention on the breath.” Here, we are referring to what may happen with
experienced meditators when this cycle of mind-wandering and meta-awareness
comes to a halt, if only for a brief period, giving way to an episode of thought-free
awareness.
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various types of self-related stimuli (Northoff et al., 2006; Sugiura
et al., 2008; Qin and Northoff, 2011; Tacikowski et al., 2017),
self-reflection (Jenkins and Mitchell, 2011; D’Argembeau, 2018)
and autobiographical memory retrieval (Cabeza and St Jacques,
2007). A recent study using dynamic causal modeling suggested
that self-referential processes are driven by PCC activity and
modulated by the regulatory influences of themPFC (Davey et al.,
2016).
Aside from changes in cerebral blood flow in these regions,
psilocybin, ayahuasca and LSD have also been consistently linked
to decreased functional integrity of the DMN (Carhart-Harris
et al., 2012, 2016b; Palhano-Fontes et al., 2015). Moreover, DMN
disintegration was correlated with reports of ego dissolution
(Carhart-Harris et al., 2016b) and decreased mental time travel to
the past (Speth et al., 2016). These findings are intriguing, because
strong DMN connectivity at rest is associated with increased
tendency for mental time travel, in particular spontaneous
thoughts about the future (Schacter et al., 2007; Godwin et al.,
2017; Karapanagiotidis et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017). This
suggests that reports of drug-induced ego dissolution may be
related to the experience of decreased self-referential thought and
mental time travel, which is also fundamental to the practice of
meditation.
While the temporary cessation of self-referential thoughts
is one way in which narrative self-consciousness may be
altered, it may also be disrupted by a total loss of access
to autobiographical memories and self-related beliefs. These
two cases are not unrelated, given that the unavailability of
personal memories and beliefs precludes the possibility of at
least some forms of de se thought and mental time travel.
However, the experience of losing access to these memories and
beliefs might differ from the mere cessation of de se thought
from a phenomenological point of view. Indeed, anecdotal
evidence from narrative self-reports suggests that drug-induced
ego dissolution may be related in some cases to reversible
retrograde amnesia, specifically regarding abstract information
about oneself (i.e., semantic autobiographical memory). For
example, one subject responding to an online questionnaire
on ego dissolution reported “forgetting that I was a male, a
human, a being on Earth—all gone, just infinite sensations and
visions,” while another stated “I no longer felt human. I didn’t
remember what a human was” (R.M., unpublished data from
an online survey on drug-induced ego dissolution completed by
experienced users of psychedelic drugs)4.
Interestingly, decreased functional connectivity within
the DMN is associated with age-related memory deficits
(Damoiseaux et al., 2008; Ward et al., 2015) and Alzheimer’s
disease (Greicius et al., 2004; Dennis and Thompson, 2014;
Dillen et al., 2017). Given the link between DMN disintegration
(decreased within-network connectivity) and ego dissolution,
it is intriguing to speculate that the temporary loss of access to
semantic autobiographical information that can occur in the
4While it is possible that such drug-induced episodes are only partially
integrated into autobiographical memory (similarly to dreams), these reports
specifically suggest that the episodes themselves may involve a loss of access to
autobiographical information.
psychedelic state may be mediated by pronounced reductions
in DMN integrity. Interestingly, post-hoc mediation analyses
from Dillen and colleagues revealed that the retrosplenial
cortex enables communication between the hippocampus
and DMN regions in healthy controls, but not in individuals
reporting cognitive decline or diagnosed with prodromal
Alzheimer’s disease (Dillen et al., 2017). Ratings of ego
dissolution under LSD have been shown to correlate with
decreased resting-state functional connectivity between the
retrosplenial cortex and the parahippocampus (Carhart-Harris
et al., 2016b). If the retrosplenial cortex acts as a gateway
between the hippocampal formation and specific DMN regions
for memory retrieval, the correlation between this change in
connectivity and ego dissolution may be related to a loss of
access to autobiographical memories. It is also interesting to
note that damage to the retrosplenial cortex has been linked
with retrograde amnesia (Valenstein et al., 1987; Takayama
et al., 1991; Gainotti et al., 1998; Oka et al., 2003), and damage
to the hippocampal formation has been associated with both
retrograde amnesia (Scoville and Milner, 1957; Squire, 1992;
Steinvorth et al., 2005) and loss of general world knowledge
(Rempel-Clower et al., 1996; Bayley et al., 2006; Gregory et al.,
2014).
In summary, narrative aspects of self-consciousness can be
radically altered during a specific conscious episode in two ways:
through a temporary cessation of self-referential thought and
mental time travel, or more dramatically through a temporary
loss of access to semantic autobiographical information, resulting
in a complete breakdown of one’s personal identity. While the
former can seemingly be induced both by contemplative practices
and by psychedelic drugs, the latter appears to be more specific to
psychedelics, and may be related to more pronounced reductions
in DMN integrity—which does not appear to be such a reliable
feature of meditation.
In the first case, the retrieval of self-related information
is effectively reduced, via attentional control in the case of
meditation, and perhaps via an involuntary attentional shift in
the case of psychedelic states. In the second case, even the
dispositional ability to retrieve such information is temporarily
impaired, which amounts to a form of reversible amnesia. It is
important to note that these alterations of narrative aspects of
self-consciousness come in degrees. At low doses of psychedelics
or in novice meditators, self-referential spontaneous thoughts
and mental time travel are unlikely to disappear entirely for an
extended period of time. By contrast, states of deep absorption
achieved by advanced meditators or with higher doses of
psychedelics are more likely to involve a complete cessation
of these thoughts. Similarly, the disruption of access to self-
related information may be partial or total in different cases.
For example, there is a difference between the inability to
remember what one has done the day before, the inability to
remember one’s name, and the inability to remember anything at
all about oneself, including that one belongs to the human species
(which has been reported, post-hoc, with certain doses of some
psychedelics). Thus, narrative aspects of self-consciousness may
be temporarily disrupted in different ways and to varying degrees
by meditation and psychedelics and it is not yet clear whether
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these different degrees or grades lie on a linear or nonlinear
scale.
Disruption of Multisensory Aspects of
Self-Consciousness
While self-related thoughts are a paradigmatic example of
self-consciousness, it is widely agreed that self-consciousness
is not strictly limited to the cognitive domain. In particular,
a number of authors have stressed the need to distinguish
between the “narrative self,” congruent with narrative aspects
of self-consciousness outlined in the previous section, and the
“minimal” or “embodied” self (Damasio, 1999; Gallagher, 2000;
Legrand and Ruby, 2009; Christoff et al., 2011; Musholt, 2013;
Zahavi, 2014). For example, Gallagher defines the minimal
self as “a consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of
experience, unextended in time” (Gallagher, 2000, p. 15), by
opposition with the temporal thickness of the narrative self-
woven by autobiographical memories and self-projection to the
future. Moreover, many authors have insisted on the idea that
the minimal self is crucially linked to embodiment and agency,
equating this basic form of self-consciousness with an awareness
of oneself as an embodied agent (Legrand, 2006; Bayne and
Pacherie, 2007; Christoff et al., 2011; Seth, 2013). While the
distinction between high-level/narrative and minimal/embodied
selfhood is helpful as a first pass to clarify the umbrella notion
of self-consciousness, it remains somewhat ambiguous and
potentially simplistic as such. As we have seen, the “narrative
self ” is better construed as a family of distinct self-referential
processes, which may or may not involve mental time travel, be
spontaneous, or recruit abstract semantic information. Likewise,
the “embodied” or “minimal” self may be construed as a complex
set of somatosensory and agentive aspects of self-consciousness
which can come apart in special cases (Blanke and Metzinger,
2009).
At least three constructs that have been related to a basic form
of self-consciousness rooted in multisensory processing may be
distinguished, namely: (a) the sense of body ownership, namely
the alleged sense of “mineness” that one experiences with respect
to one’s own body or individual limbs; (b) bodily awareness in
general, namely the awareness of any bodily sensation, either
internal (interoception and proprioception) or external (tactile);
and (c) spatial self-location, namely the experience of being
located somewhere in space with respect to one’s perceived
environment.
The Sense of Body Ownership
Body ownership is a controversial notion, as it is not obvious that
there is a phenomenology of ownership (a sense of “mineness”
over one’s body) in daily experience, or how to characterize
such phenomenology (Alsmith, 2014; Bermúdez, 2015; De
Vignemont, forthcoming). Clinical and experimental evidence
suggests that individuals may see body parts or feel tactile
sensations originating from them without experiencing them as
their own. Indeed, subjects diagnosed with the monothematic
delusion known as somatoparaphrenia routinely deny ownership
of a limb, despite the fact that nociception and touch may
be preserved in the rejected body part (Melzack, 1990; Bottini
et al., 2002; see De Vignemont, forthcoming). In the rubber
hand illusion, one of the subjects’ hands is hidden and stroked
synchronously with a rubber hand placed in an anatomically
congruent position in front of them (Botvinick and Cohen,
1998); not only do healthy participants report experiencing an
illusory ownership over the fake hand, but they also report a
loss of ownership over their real hand (Valenzuela Moguillansky
et al., 2013). Moreover, a number of physiological measurements
appear to indicate that the real limb is temporarily ‘disowned’ by
the body during the illusion, such as a drop in temperature and
an increase in histamine reactivity in the participant’s real hand
(Moseley et al., 2008; Barnsley et al., 2011; but see Rohde et al.,
2013). Beyond individual body parts, questionnaire data suggest
that ownership over one’s whole body can be manipulated in so-
called full-body illusions induced by synchronous visuotactile
stimulation, during which the participant’s body—seen in front
of them through a head-mounted display—may no longer feel
like their own (Ehrsson, 2007; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009).
Although still a matter of controversy, many authors
interpret these data as evidence that ordinary conscious
experience involves a sense of body ownership that can both
be experimentally manipulated and disrupted in clinical cases.
Experiencing one’s body as one’s own would constitute a form
of self-consciousness that does not require the possession
or deployment of a self-concept, unlike thinking of oneself.
Assuming that such a sense of body ownership is indeed
ubiquitous at least in the ordinary experience of neurotypical
individuals, is there any evidence that it can be altered by
meditation and psychedelics? Interestingly, recent studies by
Aviva Berkovich-Ohana and colleagues suggest that mindfulness
meditation can indeed induce a loss of body ownership (Dor-
Ziderman et al., 2013, 2016; Ataria et al., 2015). Ataria and
colleagues studied a single highly experienced meditator “S”
(with around 20,000 h of practice) trained in the Satipathana
and Theravada Vipassana traditions, who was reportedly able
to voluntarily induce a state in which basic aspects of self-
consciousness appeared to fade away. In particular, S described
the dissolution of the sense of body ownership in a series of
open-ended interviews following the methodological principles
of the microphenomenological interview technique, designed
to elicit fine-grained reports of subjective experience while
minimizing potential for confabulation (Petitmengin, 2006;
Petitmengin and Lachaux, 2013). S reported that in the
altered state of consciousness he achieved through meditation
“there really isn’t any [sense of ownership]. It’s a feeling
of dissolving. [It is] hard to distinguish between senses in
the body and senses outside [sic]. . . There is no sense of
mine [and] there is no sense of me” (Ataria et al., 2015,
Supplementary Material). While evidence from single-subject
studies should be treated as tentative and interpreted with
caution, Dor-Ziderman and colleagues also tested 12 long-
term mindfulness meditators in a neurophenomenological study
combining magnetoencephalogram (MEG) recording and first-
person reports (Dor-Ziderman et al., 2013). Participants were
instructed to voluntarily induce a “selfless” mode of awareness
characterized as “momentary phenomenal experience free of the
sense of agency and ownership” (Dor-Ziderman et al., 2013, p. 3).
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Subjective reports were analyzed and grouped in categories
validated by 12 naïve referees. Four reports were grouped in the
category of experiences lacking a sense of ownership, including
the following descriptions: “I understood that it was just a
sensation, it was not the hand itself. . . there was a deep thought
that all this was not mine” (subject 9); “it was emptiness, as if the
self-fell out of the picture. There was an experience but it had no
address, it was not attached to a center or subject” (subject 12);
“it was to be aware of the body, the sensations, pulse, location of
limbs, sounds and sights—to be only a witness to all this” (subject
14) (Dor-Ziderman et al., 2013, p. 6).
There are also many reports of depersonalization-like
experiences induced by psychedelics, suggesting that the sense
of body ownership can be pharmacologically manipulated
(Guttmann and Maclay, 1937; Savage, 1955; Von Mering et al.,
1955; Sedman and Kenna, 1964; Studerus et al., 2011). Reports
of drug-induced ego dissolution frequently include descriptions
of a loss of ownership over one’s body (e.g., “I felt disconnected
from my physical being, my body”; “[I] looked down at my
hand and didn’t feel anything that would indicate that this was
my hand I was looking at”; R.M., unpublished data from online
survey). An intriguing hypothesis is that top-down constraints
on body representation are loosened in the psychedelic state. In
the rubber hand illusion, for example, it has been hypothesized
that the high-level prior probability that one’s actual hand is
truly one’s own is decreased (Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013;
Apps and Tsakiris, 2014). There is preliminary evidence for
a weakening of top-down perceptual priors in the psychedelic
states, as evidenced by reduced binocular rivalry switching
rate and occasional phenomenal fusion of rival images under
psilocybin and ayahuasca (Frecska et al., 2003; Carter et al.,
2007), as well as reduced susceptibility to the “hollow mask”
illusion (unpublished result of Torsten Passie’s hollowmask study
at the Hannover Medical School in Germany). In addition, a
recent study showed that LSD attenuates top-down suppression
of prediction error in response to surprising auditory stimuli,
as measured by mismatch negativity in the auditory oddball
paradigm (Timmermann et al., in press). It is possible that a
similar disruption of top-down processing of somatosensory
stimuli plays a role in the modulation of body ownership by
psychedelics (see also Swanson, 2018 for a discussion of the
effects of psychedelics on top-down processing).
Thus, assuming that there is a phenomenology of body
ownership in ordinary experience, available evidence from
open-ended interviews and self-report questionnaires tentatively
suggests that it can go missing during certain conscious states
induced by meditation and psychedelics—not only for specific
body parts but also for the whole body. However, more evidence
is needed to confirm this hypothesis, as well as a rigorous
definition and measurement of the sense of body ownership.
Bodily Awareness
Bodily awareness can be defined as the conscious awareness of
bodily sensations in general, including tactile, proprioceptive and
interoceptive stimuli. A number of authors have argued that
bodily awareness constitutes a form of self-consciousness, in part
because it grounds self-ascriptions that are immune to error
through misidentification (Bermúdez, 2011; De Vignemont,
2011). When one feels pain, for example, one cannot be wrong
about who is in pain; generally, bodily sensations are said to be
immune to error through misidentification insofar as the only
body that one can have access to through them is one’s own. This
kind of consideration has led some philosophers to argue that
bodily awareness constitutes a basic form of self-consciousness
through which an embodied subject is directly conscious of the
bodily self (Evans, 1982; Cassam, 1997; Bermúdez, 2011). In
recent years, a similar idea has emerged within neuroscience with
a particular focus on interoception, the awareness of internal
bodily sensations such as cardiac, respiratory and gastric signals.
It has been argued that interoceptive awareness grounds a core
sense of self in normal experience, anchoring oneself in one’s
body (Damasio, 1999; Craig, 2002; Seth, 2013; Tsakiris, 2017).
It should be noted that this idea does not necessarily rest on
the hypothesis that there is a specific phenomenology of body
ownership, although it is not always easy to disentangle the claim
that one’s body is experienced as one’s own from the claim that
one’s bodily sensations underlie a consciousness of oneself as a
bodily subject. The distinction of these two claims turns on the
clarification of their theoretical commitments. Here, we will leave
this issue aside, and assume that bodily awareness constitutes a
basic form of self-consciousness, whether or not it is associated
with a specific phenomenology of ownership.
Can meditative practices and psychedelics induce a partial
or complete loss of bodily awareness? Given the focus of many
meditation practices on bodily sensations, either through open
awareness of all present moment sensations (in openmonitoring)
or through focal awareness of the breath (in focused attention),
one would not expect bodily awareness to fade away during
meditation practice. The meta-analytic cluster of activation of
the insular cortex during OM, FA, and LK reported in the
previous section (Fox et al., 2016) also suggests that bodily
awareness is central to these meditation practices, given that the
insula is an important hub for the processing of interoceptive
signals (Critchley et al., 2004; Craig, 2009; Simmons et al.,
2013). Nonetheless, there is preliminary evidence that bodily
awareness can be reduced in certain forms of mindfulness
meditation, at least for highly experienced practitioners. For
example, subject S from Ataria and colleagues’ study reported
that in the “selfless” altered state of consciousness voluntarily
achieved through meditation, bodily sensations were “almost
invisible” and reduced to a subtle and indistinct background
presence: “there is a sense of something happening, it is very hard
to tell if there is a sense of body, it is more in the background. . .
a sense of body-ness, but it’s so spread. . . I am not dead; there
is a kind of very light sense of body in this experience” (Ataria
et al., 2015, SupplementaryMaterial). In their analysis of the same
data, Dor-Ziderman and colleagues comment that “even when
the [sense of boundaries] disappears, a minimal level of dynamic
proprioception continues to exist: there remains a sense that
there is a body without any experience of [a sense of boundaries]”
(Dor-Ziderman et al., 2016, p. 3).
It is debatable whether proprioceptive awareness was retained
in this state, given the difficulty that subject S had in locating
his bodily sensations on a body-part-centered spatial frame of
reference (“I can’t tell you at all which [hand] is right and
which is left. I don’t know”, Ataria et al., 2015, Supplementary
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Material). Nonetheless, it is plausible that some degree of
interoceptive awareness was preserved, which is consistent with
the fact that the body was merely experienced as some kind
of vague background presence. Berkovich-Ohana and colleagues
also found that experienced mindfulness meditators could
significantly inhibit awareness of bodily sensations during their
practice (Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2013): “The experience of the
body faded. There was a sense of body in the background,
not in front of consciousness” (subject 4); “A wide experience
with un-defined boundaries. A sense. . . that I am dissolving, my
body dissolving.” (subject 5); “There was a vanishing of bodily
sensations” (subject 11).
While it remains unclear whether bodily awareness can
completely disappear during meditation, there is evidence that
subjects can lack any awareness of their body and of specific
bodily sensations in altered states induced by psychedelic
substances. As previously mentioned, early studies with
mescaline and LSD reported depersonalization-like effects which
occasionally involved a loss of bodily awareness (Guttmann and
Maclay, 1937; Savage, 1955; Von Mering et al., 1955; Sedman
and Kenna, 1964). In the psychometrically validated 5D-OAV
questionnaire commonly used to assess the subjective experience
of altered states of consciousness (Studerus et al., 2010), healthy
participants score rather high on the “disembodiment” factor,
which includes the item “it seemed to me as if I did not have
a body anymore,” after administration of psilocybin (Kometer
et al., 2012; Bernasconi et al., 2014; Preller et al., 2016; Pokorny
et al., 2017) and LSD (Schmid et al., 2015; Carhart-Harris et al.,
2016a,b; Kraehenmann et al., 2017; Liechti et al., 2017; Preller
et al., 2017b). The strength of the subjective effects of LSD (as
measured by the mean score on the 5D-ASC questionnaire) was
found to correlate with the magnitude of increase in functional
connectivity in a somatomotor network including the primary
motor and sensorimotor cortices, the caudal premotor cortex
and the superior parietal lobule (Preller et al., 2017a).
In a recent neuroimaging study of DMT, a drug whose short
lasting subjective effects are more intense and immersive than
those of psilocybin or LSD, almost all participants reported a loss
of awareness of their body for several minutes during the peak
of the experience in post-hocmicrophenomenological interviews:
“I lost awareness of gravity and awareness of my body”
(Timmermann et al., in preparation). There is also considerable
anecdotal evidence from narrative reports that psychedelics can
radically disrupt bodily awareness, an effect often associated with
the dissolution of the sense of self (Millière, 2017): “It felt as if
‘I’ did no longer exist. There was purely my sensory perception of
my environment, but sensory input was not translated into needs,
feelings, or acting by “me”. Also, I felt disconnected from my
physical being, my body” (R.M., unpublished data from online
survey). Anecdotal evidence regarding the dramatic effects of 5-
MeO-DMT suggests that this drug may be particularly effective
at suppressing bodily awareness, although controlled studies of
these effects are needed5.
5See section Spatial self-location below for anecdotal reports and questionnaire
data regarding states induced by 5-MeO-DMT.
Thus, it seems that certain meditation practices may
inhibit awareness of bodily sensations, reduced in some
cases to a mere background interoceptive awareness, while
psychedelic substances (DMT and 5-MeO-DMT in particular)
may completely suppress awareness of the body. Sensory
deprivation is likely to be a factor in this reduction of
bodily awareness: meditators are usually sitting in silence
with eyes closed, while participants of neuroimaging studies
of psychedelics are often lying down in supine position with
a blindfold. The lack of somatosensory and motor feedback
in these states may play an important role in the loss of
bodily awareness. Interestingly, two recent findings emphasize
the influence of sensory deprivation on the plasticity of body
representation: short-term visual deprivation has been shown
to lead to significantly larger proprioceptive drift in the rubber
hand illusion (Radziun and Ehrsson, 2018), while audio-visual
sensory deprivation has been found to degrade the boundary
of the whole body peripersonal space (Noel et al., 2018). These
results suggest that sensory deprivation enhances the flexiblity of
body representation, and could facilitate the disruption of bodily
awareness in meditation and psychedelic states.
Finally, it is important to note that psychedelic drugs, just
like some styles of meditation, may also increase awareness
of the body, especially at lower doses associated with
salient and unusual bodily sensations (see section Toward
a multidimensional model of altered self-consciousness below).
Finally, it can also be observed that drug-induced states are not
the only known altered states of consciousness in which bodily
awareness can fade away altogether; there is good evidence that
this can also be the case in so-called “bodiless” dreams (LaBerge
and DeGracia, 2000; Cicogna and Bosinelli, 2001; see Windt,
2010, 2015; Occhionero and Cicogna, 2011) and “asomatic”
out-of-body experiences (Alvarado, 2000; see Metzinger, 2013).
Spatial Self-Location
A third notion associated with a minimal form of self-
consciousness rooted in multisensory integration is spatial self-
location (Blanke andMetzinger, 2009; Serino et al., 2013; Maselli,
2015). It has been argued that perceptual experience, and visual
experience in particular, is self-locating (Cassam, 1997; Noë, 2005;
Schwenkler, 2014). This idea typically combines two claims: first,
in virtue of being structured by an egocentric frame of reference6,
visual experience represents the location of the point of origin
of this reference frame relatively to environmental landmarks;
secondly, the location of this point of origin is represented as
the location of the subject (i.e., where I am located with respect
to objects in the visual scene). This analysis may be extended
to other sensory modalities whose content presumably has a
perspectival structure centered onto a single point of origin, such
as auditory perception (Coleman, 1963; Zahorik et al., 2005;
Kolarik et al., 2016).
Whether perspectival structure always entails self-locating
content—namely a representation of the location of the origin as
the location of the subject—is a matter of debate (Alsmith, 2017).
Some authors have argued that self-locating content also requires
6On the notion of egocentric frame of reference, see Klatzky (1998).
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the ability to act upon objects perceived in one’s environment
(Brewer, 1992; Schellenberg, 2007; Alsmith, 2017). Nonetheless,
it is generally agreed that ordinary perceptual experience has
self-locating content. In other words, one normally experiences
oneself as located at a certain distance with respect to objects
perceived in one’s environment. Interestingly, both questionnaire
data and behavioral measurements suggest that self-location can
be manipulated in full-body illusions, such that subjects may feel
located outside of their own body (Ehrsson, 2007; Guterstam
et al., 2015) or closer to the virtual avatar over which they
feel ownership during the illusion (Lenggenhager et al., 2007,
2009; Ionta et al., 2011). Similarly, out-of-body experiences and
heautoscopic phenomena of clinical origin, in which subjects
hallucinate seeing their own body from the outside, appear to
involve a shift of self-location (often to an elevated position)
associated with a hallucinatory visuospatial perspective (Blanke
and Arzy, 2005; Blanke and Mohr, 2005).
Such experimental and clinical evidence isolating spatial self-
location as a dissociable component of ordinary experience has
led researchers to claim that it constitutes an important aspect of
bodily self-consciousness (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Blanke
et al., 2015), and even a minimally sufficient condition for
self-consciousness (Metzinger, 2013; Windt, 2015). Interestingly,
there is evidence that both meditation and psychedelics may
radically disrupt the experience of being located somewhere in
space; moreover, this disruption appears to be often associated
with reports of “selflessness” or “ego dissolution,” suggesting that
spatial self-location is indeed a basic and important building
block of self-consciousness. The highly experienced mindfulness
meditator studied by Ataria and colleagues described the selfless
state he reportedly achieved for the experiment in the following
terms: “it’s like falling into empty space. . . and a sense of
dissolving. . . and there really isn’t a center. . . I don’t have any
kind of sense of location. . . I have no idea where I am in
stage three, it’s all background, I’m not there basically, just
world, so there’s no real location at all in stage three. It’s very
minimal, almost nothing. . . When there’s no boundary, there’s
no personal point of view, it’s the world point of view, it’s like
the world looking, not [me] looking, the world is looking.”
(Ataria et al., 2015, Supplementary Material). As Dor-Ziderman
and colleagues comment, in this meditation-induced altered
state of consciousness, it seems that “the sense of orientation
in space is lost altogether” (Dor-Ziderman et al., 2016, p.
3). In another neuroimaging study of long-term mindfulness
meditation practitioners, Berkovich-Ohana and colleagues found
that some of them were able to induce what they described
as a state of “spacelessness,” reported in the following terms:
“the center of space became endless, without a reference point
in the middle” (subject 4); “it was a sense of spaciousness,
boundlessness. . . there was no clarity where the center is and
where is the periphery. There was no quality of border” (subject
11) (Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2013).
Likewise, there is converging evidence from subjective reports
that psychedelic drugs can induce a loss of spatial self-
location, associated to loss of boundary between self and world
and a feeling of unity with everything (Millière, 2017): “I
felt myself mold into the world around me. . . ,” “My mind
started to blend with everything” (R.M., unpublished data
from online survey). On the psychometrically-validated 5D-
ASC questionnaire, subjects score high on the factor related
to “experience of unity” after administration of LSD (Schmid
et al., 2015; Carhart-Harris et al., 2016a,b; Kraehenmann et al.,
2017; Liechti et al., 2017; Preller et al., 2017b) and to a slightly
lesser extent psilocybin (Kometer et al., 2012; Bernasconi et al.,
2014; Preller et al., 2016; Pokorny et al., 2017). This factor
includes the items “it seemed to me that my environment and
I were one” and “everything seemed to unify into oneness”.
Moreover, studies using custom questionnaire items have also
measured high scores for “I experienced a sense of merging
with my surroundings” after administration of psilocybin and
LSD (Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2013; Carhart-Harris et al.,
2016b; Schartner et al., 2017). A recent online survey on the
effects of 5-MeO-DMT with 515 participants also found that the
overwhelmingmajority of respondents scored positively on items
of the Mystical Experience Questionnaire corresponding to “Loss
of your usual sense of space” (95% of respondents), “Loss of usual
awareness of where you were” (88% of respondents) and “Being
in a realmwith no space boundaries” (87% of respondents) (Davis
et al., 2018).
In addition to questionnaire data from controlled studies,
there is a large amount of anecdotal evidence from online
narrative reports that DMT and 5-MeO-DMT can induce a loss
of self-location: “at the time I didn’t know where it was, or where
I was... I didn’t know what had happened before this point, in-
between, sideways, up, down or anywhere” (DMT, report from
www.dmt-nexus.me), “I was the universe, I was everywhere
and nowhere, everything and nothing all at the same time” (5-
MeO-DMT, report #49690 from Erowid.org), “The feeling was
very cosmic, of oneness with everything” (5-MeO-DMT, report
#78485 from Erowid.org), “an immediate complete dissolution
of any identity and a merging into the Oneness, timeless,
pure awareness and light energy of the Universe. . . Similar in
some ways with a previous Samadhi meditation experience”
(5-MeO-DMT, report #5804 from Erowid.org; see below on
Samadhimeditation). A similar phenomenological report can be
found in a (non-academic) monograph on 5-MeO-DMT: “I was
completely disconnected somatically, unable to locate or feel my
body. . . unable to locate myself—or anything else—anywhere in
particular. I had no body, not even the slightest semblance of
a dream-body or mental-body, and I had absolutely no sense
of where I was” (Masters, 2005). Taken at face value, these
reports suggest that psychedelic drugs can induce experiences
which may have perceptual content without spatial—or at least
self-locating—content. Although narrative reports from online
databases offer at best anecdotal evidence, their convergence with
questionnaire data from multiple controlled studies suggests that
they may be taken into consideration to inform hypotheses about
the effect of psychedelics on the sense of self-location.
We note that these reports of meditative and psychedelic
experiences lacking spatial self-locating content might be
reminiscent of reports of conscious episodes during dreamless
sleep, which allegedly lack any form of self-consciousness and
spatial content (Thompson, 2014a; Windt et al., 2016). Jennifer
Windt has argued that such dreamless sleep experiences might be
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characterized by “pure subjective temporality,” conceived as the
minimal phenomenology of temporal self-location (“nowness”)
and duration (Windt, 2014). If such states do exist, we can
plausibly hypothesize that they might also be induced by
meditation and psychedelic drugs, on the basis of the preliminary
evidence discussed in this section. However, we also note that
many reports of drug-induced ego dissolution, especially with
5-MeO-DMT, insist on the timeless character of the experience,
described as a complete loss of the sense of temporal duration.
The aforementioned online survey on the effects of 5-MeO-DMT
found that the overwhelming majority of respondents scored
positively on items of the Mystical Experience Questionnaire
corresponding to “Loss of your usual sense of time” (97% of
respondents), “Experience of timelessness” (90% of respondents),
“Sense of being outside of time, beyond past and future” (89%
of respondents) and “Feeling that you experienced eternity or
infinity” (88% of respondents) (Davis et al., 2018). Interestingly,
some mindfulness meditators have been reported to achieve a
similar disruption of the phenomenology of duration through
their practice (Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2013). Thus, we tentatively
suggest that some drug-induced and meditative states might lack
both spatial and temporal self-locating content.
From a neurophysiological point of view, it is interesting to
note that the intensity of drug-induced ego dissolution reported
by participants under LSD was found to correlate with the
magnitude of increased functional connectivity in the bilateral
insular cortex and the temporoparietal junction (Tagliazucchi
et al., 2016). Meanwhile, Dor-Ziderman and colleagues found
that the transition fromminimal self-consciousness to a “selfless”
state characterized by a loss of body ownership and self-location
in experienced meditators was correlated with a decrease in beta
power in the temporoparietal junction (Dor-Ziderman et al.,
2016). These findings are intriguing since there is evidence
from neuroimaging studies of out-of-body experiences and full-
body illusions that the temporoparietal junction plays a role in
processing spatial self-location (Blanke and Arzy, 2005; Ionta
et al., 2011; Blanke, 2012). Given that a number of intracranial
EEG and MEG studies have suggested that beta oscillations
encode top-down modulations of predictions (Bauer et al., 2014;
Michalareas et al., 2016; Sedley et al., 2016), it is intriguing
to speculate that decreased beta power in the TPJ may relate
to weakened top-down constraint on multisensory processing
underlying self-location. In addition, the insular cortex is
associated with the integration of interoceptive information
(Craig, 2009; Simmons et al., 2013), and may play an important
role in body awareness and ownership (Aspell et al., 2013;
Seth, 2013; Suzuki et al., 2013). Thus, while the modulation
of beta oscillatory power and functional connectivity in the
temporoparietal junction in some psychedelic and meditative
states may be linked to the disruption of spatial self-location, the
modulation of functional connectivity in the insula during drug-
induced ego dissolution might be specifically related to the loss of
bodily awareness. However, more data is needed to confirm these
hypotheses.
To conclude this section, it should be noted that our overview
of narrative and multisensory aspects of self-consciousness has
left out the notion of the sense of agency, typically defined as
the experience of being in control of one’s actions (Haggard,
2017). There are three reasons for this omission aside from
spatial constraints. Firstly, the sense of agency is an ambiguous
concept, which has been construed both as a feeling of control
over one’s bodily movements allegedly produced by comparator
mechanisms, and as a feeling of control over the production
of one’s thoughts. Secondly, there is little available evidence
regarding how the sense of agency, in either construal, may
be modulated by meditation and drug-induced states. Although
experiences of self-loss with both psychedelics and meditation
typically occur when subjects are immobile (in seated or supine
position), increased voluntary control over one’s breathing in
certain styles of meditation could modulate the sense of bodily
agency. Further evidence could be provided by measures of
intentional binding during meditation and psychedelic states.
Likewise, one could expect attentional control of spontaneous
thoughts in meditation to have an effect on the sense of cognitive
agency, if this notion is valid. Finally, it is worth mentioning
that the claim that voluntary movements and thoughts are
ordinarily accompanied by a pervasive sense of agency has
recently come under criticism (Grünbaum, 2015; Grünbaum
and Christensen, 2017; Parrott, 2017). According to a more
deflationary account, there is no special phenomenology of
agency in ordinary experience7.
PURE CONSCIOUSNESS, NON-DUAL
AWARENESS AND TOTAL SELFLESSNESS
In this section, we examine in more detail some meditation
practices which explicitly aim at a dissolution of all aspects of
self-consciousness, and consider how the resulting global states of
consciousness compare to drug-induced states. More specifically,
we focus on practices targeting the subject-object dichotomy
which allegedly structures ordinary conscious experience, in
order to reach a state of “non-dual awareness” (NDA; Josipovic,
2010), or even induce a state of consciousness supposedly empty,
i.e., devoid of any content (“pure consciousness”). It is an open
question whether NDA differs from pure consciousness, and in
what respect; but a critical examination of descriptions of these
states suggests that both may involve a dramatic form of self-
loss characterized by a dramatic inhibition of the dimensions of
self-consciousness outlined in the previous section.
7In a predictive coding framework, in particular, it is reasonable to assume that the
violation of expectations regarding one’s bodily movements, rather than the match
between those expectations and sensory feedback, modulates phenomenology.
Accordingly, prediction error signals might give rise to a feeling of alienation from
one’s action, but the absence of prediction error signals should not be associated
with a positive feeling of agency (Fletcher and Frith, 2009; although see Hohwy,
2016 for a predictive coding account of the sense of agency). This explanatory
model can be extended to thoughts to account for schizophrenic thought insertion
without appealing to a loss of the sense of agency (Parrott, 2017). However, it
should be acknowledged that the existence of a positive phenomenology of agency
might be more in line with the active inference framework, according to which
organisms minimize prediction error not only by updating prior expectations, but
also through action (Friston, 2013). Within this framework, the sense of agency
may result from the process of modeling the effects of the selective sampling of
sensations through action (Limanowski and Blankenburg, 2013).
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Non-dual Awareness
Non-dual awareness meditation (NDA) refers to a family of
practices which can be found in several Eastern contemplative
traditions, including Dzoghen and Maha¯mudra¯ within Tibetan
Buddhism, and Advaita Vedanta and Kashimiri Shaivism within
Hinduism (Josipovic, 2010; Dunne, 2011). NDAmeditation rests
on three core assumptions: (a) ordinary experience is “dual” or
dichotomous, insofar as it is structured around a subject-pole
and an object-pole; (b) this subject-object dichotomy is illusory,
because conscious awareness as such is not fundamentally dual;
(c) it is possible, through the practice of NDA meditation, to
dispel this illusion and directly experience conscious awareness
as non-dual. All of these assumptions are worth discussing. The
first assumption, in particular, requires clarification. It is rather
uncontroversial that all conscious mental states have a subject
of experience, insofar as “an experience is impossible without
an experience” (Frege, 1956, p. 299, translation modified). This
is merely a metaphysical requirement of conscious experience8.
However, assumption (a) goes further in claiming that the
phenomenal character of conscious experience is itself structured
by a subject-object dichotomy.
There are at least two ways to understand this claim. As we
have seen in the previous section, a number of components
of ordinary experience can be related to a form of self-
consciousness—including self-related thought, body ownership,
bodily awareness and spatial awareness. One can claim that
conscious experience normally involves a background awareness
of oneself which is reducible to one or several of these
components (Damasio, 1999; Blanke and Metzinger, 2009;
Bermúdez, 2011; Seth, 2013). According to this reductionist
interpretation, ordinary consciousness is structured by a
subject/object dichotomy insofar as we are normally aware
of ourselves via thought, perception and bodily sensations
in addition to being aware of external objects. A second
interpretation holds that there is a form of sui generis self-
awareness in experience which is irreducible to the cognitive,
bodily and spatial features of experience: “being presented with
something necessarily involves being pre-reflectively and pre-
conceptually aware of being the subject to whom something
is presented” (Nida-Rümelin, 2017, p. 66; see also Strawson,
1999; Kriegel, 2009; Zahavi, 2014; Guillot, 2017). According to
8Importantly, the notion of subject of experience at play in this claim is very
thin—it does not carry more substantial commitments about subjects being
Cartesian substances enduring in time, or identical to organisms or parts of
organisms. Rather, the claim merely stems from conceptual analysis of the notion
of experience. Accordingly, a thin subject of experience is simply the bare locus of
an experience; an experience cannot occur without there being something it is like
for such a thin subject to have it, and conversely a thin subject cannot exist without
the occurrence of an experience whose subject it is (see Peacocke, 2014; Strawson,
2017). One might wonder whether this supposedly uncontroversial claim is
compatible with the Buddhist “no self ” doctrine. This is a difficult question, not
least because there are several interpretations of the “no self ” doctrine. However,
common interpretations of the “no self ” view articulate two claims: a metaphysical
claim, according to which there is no such thing as the self construed as a substance
or enduring entity; and a phenomenological claim, according to which the sense
of self is not a necessary and invariant feature of experience (see MacKenzie,
2016). Both points are compatible with the minimal claim that all experiences have
subjects of experiences, in the thin sense outlined above.
this second interpretation, the seemingly dichotomous nature of
experience does not rest on a specific kind of self-representing
content, but on the very nature of conscious representation in
general, which is structured by an implicit distinction between
the represented objects and the subject to whom those objects are
presented. In similar fashion, Evan Thompson has argued that
ordinary experience is infused with a sense of mineness such that
every thought, emotion, perception or sensation is experienced as
one’s own, and has also suggested that this feature can disappear
during meditation (Thompson, 2014b, p. 362).
On both of these interpretations, conscious experience is
structured by a subject-object dichotomy insofar as it involves
an awareness of oneself in addition to the awareness of external
objects. Accordingly, non-dual awareness states can be construed
as conscious states which lack the background self-awareness
normally present in experience. However, a core assumption
of non-dual awareness meditation practices is that the subject-
object dichotomy supposedly found in ordinary experience
is illusory, in line with the so-called “no self ” doctrine of
Buddhism (ana¯tman in Sanskrit or anatta¯ in Pali). Thus,
non-dual awareness practice is supposed to reveal that the
putative phenomenological distinction between oneself and one’s
experience of the external world is ultimately an illusion9.
While this general idea appears to be consistent with recent
proposals regarding the notion of non-dual awareness, it is not
always clear which of the two interpretations outlined above
is favored. For example, Wolfgang Fasching has argued that
in normal experience, subjects are aware of their body and
location in addition to objects of the external world, which
suggests that he favors the reductionist interpretation of the
subject/object dichotomy. In the same vein, he suggests that
self-consciousness is rooted in the identification of oneself with
“certain configurations of experienced contents as opposed to
others” (Fasching, 2008, p. 476), which is also consistent with
the first interpretation. However, he goes on to argue that “in
perception I am necessarily co-conscious of myself ” (Fasching,
2008, p. 472), because the subject/object polarity is built in all
conscious representational states. He further claims that some
meditation practices can reveal that “I am not something ‘inner’
as distinct from external objects” and that “there is no ‘I’ to which
things are given, there is just the event of givenness” (Fasching,
2008, p. 478). In this context, meditation is conceived as a way of
becoming aware of consciousness as such, without the illusory
distinction between the subject and the objects of experience.
Fasching cites a central text of the Vedic tradition, the Ma¯n. d. u¯ya
Upanis.ad, which describes the state of non-dual awareness
reached through meditation as one in which the subject is
“not conscious of the internal world, nor conscious of the
external world” (Deutsch, 1969, p. 62). Similarly drawing on the
Vedic tradition, Miri Albahari suggests that non-dual awareness
meditation involves “a direct realization that consciousness. . . is
ownerless” (Albahari, 2010, p. 104).
9Note that this further assumption does not sit well with the proposals of Nida-
Rümelin and Zahavi, according to whom “pre-reflective self-awareness” or “self-
givenness” is a necessary component of all conscious experiences in general.
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These descriptions seem consistent with the second
interpretation above: in ordinary conscious states, subjects
have a sense that all of their experiences are theirs, given to
them, or owned by them; in turn, this introduces an artificial
distinction between oneself as the subject of experience and the
experiences themselves; finally, trained meditators can dispel this
illusion by becoming aware of consciousness itself as a non-dual
process. Although we cannot discuss this proposal at length
within the scope of this article, it is worth underlining that it
rests on a controversial picture of ordinary experience. Indeed,
the idea that consciousness is normally infused with a special
sense of phenomenal mineness or awareness of oneself as the
owner of one’s experiences is far from obvious and has been met
with a number of objections (see Howell and Thompson, 2017;
O’Conaill, 2017; Chadha, 2018; McClelland, forthcoming; Wu,
forthcoming).
By contrast, the first interpretation of non-duality outlined
above seems consistent with the evidence presented in the
previous section: the inhibition of self-related thoughts, body
ownership, bodily awareness and self-location should entail
a blurring or dissolution of the boundary between self and
world, and the associated “unitive experience”—identified by
Walter Stace as the core feature of so-called “mystical-type
experiences” (Stace, 1960). Although narrative and multisensory
aspects of self-consciousness are not illusory as components
of ordinary experience, their transient cessation in meditation
or drug-induced states may be interpreted as revealing that
their association with a more substantial notion of selfhood is
fallacious (see also Metzinger, 2003; MacKenzie, 2016; Letheby
and Gerrans, 2017). It is worth noting, however, that classic
accounts of non-dual awareness in the Buddhist and Hindu
traditions emphasize its reliance on the loss of narrative aspects
of self-consciousness more than the loss of multisensory aspects.
Non-dual Maha¯mudra¯ practice, for example, instructs students
to “drop thoughts of past, present and future and release themind
into its natural state of clear, non-conceptual awareness” (Dunne,
2011, p. 81). Consequently, it is possible that global states of
consciousness reached through NDA meditation may preserve
some awareness of bodily sensations10.
In summary, we have suggested that the notion of NDA
states can be understood in two different ways. According to
the first interpretation, they are conscious states in which both
narrative and perhaps multisensory aspects of self-consciousness
are radically disrupted, such the distinction between oneself and
the external world no longer has an experiential basis. According
to the second interpretation, ordinary conscious states involve a
minimal form of self-awareness which is not tied to any specific
content, but to a special sense of “self-givenness” or “mineness”
built in normal experience; in NDA states, this feature supposedly
goes missing, such that subjects become aware of consciousness
itself as an ownerless process. While the second interpretation
rests on a controversial assumption about normal experience, the
10One possibility, in line with the distinctions outlined in section Alterations of
self-consciousness induced by meditation and psychedelics, is that NDA states
may involve a minimal awareness of bodily sensations (e.g., interoceptive signals)
without a sense of body ownership (an awareness of these sensations as one’s own).
first is consistent with the evidence presented so far regarding
the phenomenology of alleged “selfless” states in meditation and
drug-induced states11.
Although there have been few neuroimaging studies of NDA
meditation, the available evidence is intriguing. In the resting
state, activity in the default-mode network has been found to be
negatively correlated with activity in a set of regions commonly
recruited in attention-demanding tasks, in particular the sensory
(Golland et al., 2007), dorsal attention network and fronto-
parietal control network (Greicius et al., 2003; Fox et al., 2005;
Uddin et al., 2009; Chai et al., 2012; Carbonell et al., 2014).
A similar pattern of anticorrelation has been reported during
mindfulness meditation (Brewer et al., 2011; Kilpatrick et al.,
2011; Hasenkamp et al., 2012), and there is some preliminary
evidence of increased anti-correlation between the DMN and
a task-positive network during focused attention meditation
compared to the resting state (Josipovic et al., 2012). However,
Josipovic and colleagues found that this anticorrelation was
significantly decreased during NDAmeditation compared to both
focused awareness meditation and the resting state (Josipovic
et al., 2012; Josipovic, 2014). It is worth noting that a similar
pattern of increased correlation between the DMN and the
habitually anti-correlated networks has been observed during
various other forms of meditation, such as mantra recitation
(Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2015) as well as choiceless-awareness,
loving-kindness and concentration in experienced meditators
compared to novice meditators (Brewer et al., 2011). Thus, it is
questionable that this change of connectivity is unique to NDA
meditation. Interestingly, a similar decrease of the anticorrelation
between the DMN and a task-positive network has been observed
after administration of psilocybin, and was hypothesized to
correlate with decreased separatedness between internally and
externally focused states (Carhart-Harris et al., 2013). Although
this hypothesis is speculative, it is possible that conscious states
induced through NDA meditation have a lot in common with
certain states of “ego dissolution” induced by psychedelics from a
phenomenological point of view. Before discussing this potential
convergence, we will assess how NDA may relate to so-called
“pure consciousness.”
Pure Consciousness
The notion of pure consciousness seems to originate in Stace
(1960, p. 86), who applies it to mystical experiences. A purely
conscious state is characterized by “an ‘emptying out’ by a subject
of all experiential content and phenomenological qualities,
11To be clear, we are not denying that actual descriptions of NDA states from
contemplative scholars may seem more consistent with the second interpretation,
if they are taken at face value. Rather, we suggest that such an interpretation
rests on an account of the phenomenology of ordinary experience which is at
best ambiguous and at worst implausible—in so far as it seems to postulate
the ubiquity of a sui generis “sense of mineness.” Accordingly, we put forward
an interpretation of NDA states which appears to be more consistent with
an evidence-based account of the multiple dimensions of the sense of self, as
described in section Alterations of self-consciousness induced by meditation and
psychedelics. It is also worth emphasizing that our purpose in this article is not
to engage in the exegesis of historical sources from the Buddhist and Hindu
traditions, but to offer a critical discussion of available evidence regarding global
states of consciousness described as involving a dramatic loss of the sense of self.
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including concepts, thoughts, sense perception, and sensuous
images” (Gellman, 2017). States which have been qualified as
purely conscious include experiences reached through certain
forms of meditation (Nash and Newberg, 2013) and mystical
experiences (Stace, 1960; Shear, 1994).
There has been considerable debate about whether purely
conscious states are even possible. Some have argued that they
are impossible because one cannot be conscious without being
conscious of anything at all (Bayne, 2007, p. 16) or because one
cannot have episodic memory of a state devoid of experiential
content (Bagger, 1999, p. 102; Gennaro, 2008). Others have
argued that pure consciousness is not ruled out by logical
or phenomenological considerations (Woodhouse, 1990; Shear,
1994), and that we might even find empirical evidence of pure
consciousness in contemplative practices (Koch, 2004; Baars,
2013; Metzinger, 2013; Nash and Newberg, 2013) or dreamless
sleep (Windt et al., 2016). Note that this apparent disagreement
could be a mere verbal dispute, because there is an important
ambiguity in the notion of a conscious mental state devoid of any
content. Indeed, “content” might refer here to representational or
phenomenal content.
Although controversial, the hypothesis that some conscious
mental states lack representational content has been defended
on the ground that states such as moods, pain or orgasm
which do not seem to represent anything (Rey, 1998; Kind,
2007; Aydede, 2009). This is in fact the basis of a prominent
objection to representationalism, the thesis that all phenomenally
conscious states have representational content, or in its stronger
version that the phenomenal character of all conscious mental
states is wholly constituted by their representational content.
But representational contentlessness is presumably not what
proponents of pure consciousness have in mind, as they
suggest that purely conscious states lack “all determinate
phenomenological contents... whatsoever” (Shear, 1994, p. 320).
Thus, the strict definition of a purely conscious state would
be a conscious mental state lacking phenomenal character.
However, this definition cannot be taken literally if we are talking
about phenomenal consciousness: by definition, a phenomenally
conscious mental state is a mental state such that there is
something it like for a creature to be in it (Nagel, 1974), and
if there is something it is like to be in a mental state then the
mental state has phenomenal character. Therefore, the notion
of a (phenomenally) conscious mental state literally lacking
phenomenal character is absurd (Gennaro, 2008; Strawson,
2013): the experience of absence is not equivalent to the absence
of experience.
There is, however, a more plausible, non-literal definition
of pure consciousness as a conscious state lacking ordinary
phenomenal content (Gennaro, 2008; Strawson, 2013). The
question, then, is what counts as an ordinary phenomenal
content, and how phenomenally “bare” or “sparse” purely
conscious states can get. Presumably, if there are phenomenal
properties pertaining to self-consciousness in ordinary
experience (i.e., the narrative and somatosensory aspects of
self-consciousness previously discussed), then such ordinary
phenomenal properties should be missing in purely conscious
states, among other ordinary phenomenal properties. Defined in
this way, pure consciousness appears to be at least conceivable,
and constitutes a plausible candidate for a wholly “selfless”
state, lacking self-referential thoughts, bodily ownership, body
awareness and self-location. The question is now whether
purely conscious states can actually occur, specifically during
meditation or after psychedelic intake, and whether they differ
from states of alleged “non-dual awareness.”
In the Hindu and Buddhist traditions, the meditative practice
called Samadhi aims at inducing a state of deep absorption
(Shankman, 2008). The practice of Samadhi includes four stages
or jhanas, culminating in a “formless” or “objectless” state. It
relies on successive shifts of attention, first from the breath
to somatosensory pleasure, then to mere positive affect, until
all intentional objects have been stripped away and only “one-
pointed” awareness remains. In the final stage of Samadhi
practice (i.e., the last jhana), “there is no directing of attention,
no representation held in focal attention, no pleasure and no
aversion, affective contentment has dropped away, and all that
remains is an alert, clear, one-pointed, equanimous awareness.”
(Yamashiro, 2015, p. 7).
The aim of this practice is frequently described as reaching
a state of pure consciousness which involves a complete loss
of self-consciousness: “attaining Samadhi is to reach the silent
state of pure consciousness where there is no phenomenological
content and a loss of any sense of individual self or duality”
(Wahbeh et al., 2018, p. 6)12. Miri Albahari has suggested
that the state of pure consciousness allegedly reached through
Samadhi meditation could provide evidence for the existence of
what she calls “witness-consciousness,” which she defines as the
neutral common denominator between all conscious experience
(Albahari, 2009). She argues that witness-consciousness has its
own intrinsic phenomenal character, which explains why purely
conscious states in Samadhi are not devoid of phenomenal
content, and thus not logically inconsistent. However, this
hypothesis seems unduly inflationary: rather than postulating
that a special “objectless” phenomenology is ubiquitous in
consciousness and is the only thing remaining in purely
conscious states, one may seek to describe such states as a form
of deep absorption associated with extreme sensory gating which
does not have much in common with ordinary experience.
Unfortunately, the neurophysiological evidence regarding
Samadhi practice is still extremely sparse (Yamashiro, 2015). A
single-participant study found decreased activity in Brodmann
areas 5 and 7, which may be associated with the representation
of the body’s orientation in three-dimensional space (Hagerty
et al., 2013). This reflected the participant’s experience of
losing body boundaries. Nash and Newberg (2013) also suggest
that activity of the posterior parietal lobule is modulated by
Samadhi, and “might be critical for distinguishing between
the self and the external world” (Nash and Newberg, 2013, p.
8). Another contemplative tradition which aims at inducing
pure consciousness is transcendental meditation (TM), whose
goal is the “loss of boundaries of time, space, and body sense
12As previously noted, it is by definition impossible for a phenomenally conscious
mental state to lack any phenomenal content. More realistically, states induced by
Samadhi practice might lack ordinary phenomenal content.
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that defines the framework for typical waking experience,” but
neurophysiological data on TM is also very limited (Travis and
Pearson, 2000; Wahbeh et al., 2018).
It is unclear to what extent the notions of non-dual
awareness and pure consciousness should be distinguished, both
in terms of their conceptualization in the relevant literature on
contemplative traditions, and in terms of the phenomenology
and neurophysiology of the associated states induced by
meditation. According to Josipovic, NDA meditation is not
content-driven like focused attention and open monitoring,
because it seeks awareness of the background of experience
rather than any specific bodily or perceptual content (Josipovic,
2014). Moreover, he argues that NDA meditation also differs
from “objectless” meditation “in which the mind is emptied
of content and held in an empty state through the force
of concentration” (Josipovic, 2014, p. 12)13. Indeed, Josipovic
contends that pure consciousness practice like Samadhi aims at
actively “eliminating” each pole of the subject/object dichotomy,
while NDA meditation involves the recognition of a background
non-dual awareness that “precedes conceptualization and
intentionality” (Josipovic, 2014, p. 12). Likewise, John Dunne
argues that non-dual awareness differs from objectlessmeditation
techniques such as Samadhi insofar as it should not involve
any cognitive effort (Dunne, 2011). However, these conceptual
distinctions are not straightforward, and there is not yet enough
data on the phenomenology and neurobiology of alleged states
of “pure consciousness” and “non-dual awareness” to determine
whether these are valid and distinct constructs.
As we have suggested, one possible construal of non-dual
awareness is in terms of the inhibition of both narrative
and multisensory aspects of self-consciousness, leading to a
temporary loss of experiential boundary between self and world,
or between endogenous and exogenous stimuli. In turn, purely
conscious states could be defined as states of extreme absorption
involving high sensory gating, whose sparse phenomenal content
has little overlap with the rich phenomenology of ordinary
wakeful experience. If these tentative definitions are sound,
states of pure consciousness should also be states of non-
dual awareness, because they should lack ordinary phenomenal
content including the narrative and multisensory components of
self-consciousness. By contrast, non-dual awareness might not
entail pure consciousness, because states of total self-loss (lacking
narrative and multisensory self-consciousness) need not have
very sparse phenomenal content.
This raises the question of whether psychedelic drugs can
induce virtually “contentless” states similar to the descriptions of
pure consciousness from mystical and contemplative traditions.
While most reports of drug-induced ego dissolution involve a
rich sensory phenomenology, including vivid hallucinations, this
is not always the case. In particular, there is anecdotal evidence
that certain compounds such as 5-MeO-DMT may induce states
13However, recent data suggests that TM practice does not involve focused
attention either and relies on distinctmechanisms; given that TM is often described
in terms of pure consciousness, this casts doubt on Josipovic’s assumption that
“objectless” meditation is a form of focused attention (Travis and Parim, 2017).
of radical absorption reminiscent of Samadhi practice14. Indeed,
users of 5-MeO-DMT frequently describe an experience of
“emptiness,” “nothingness” or “void” which is associated with
a cessation of thoughts, extreme sensory deprivation and a
complete loss of self-consciousness: “my brain was not conveying
anything meaningful from what my senses were receiving; I was
completely unaware of my body, experiencing profound stillness”
(report #99920 from Erowid.org); “I felt that there was nothing
to me and there was nothing around me” (#11701); “the reality
around me disintegrated into nothing. I fell into a void [that]
I can’t even describe” (#23487); “I wasn’t anything anymore. I
had been broken down into nothingness, into oblivion” (#87426);
“my thoughts ceased to exist, and my senses shut off completely.
I could not hear, see, smell, taste or feel anything” (#37301). This
suggests that states of drug-induced ego dissolution may vary not
only according to the extent to which narrative and multisensory
aspects of self-consciousness are inhibited, but also according to
the richness or sparsity of their phenomenology. While some
forms of self-loss induced by psychedelics may involve a rich
sensory phenomenology, others are more similar to descriptions
of “pure consciousness,” and may be almost devoid of sensory
content.
TOWARD A MULTIDIMENSIONAL MODEL
OF ALTERED SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
In what precedes, we have suggested that some meditation
practices and some psychedelic substances can disrupt self-
consciousness in different ways, or more precisely can disrupt
different aspects or components of self-consciousness. This
analysis stems from the assumption that self-consciousness is not
a simple or unidimensional construct, as many other authors
have emphasized (Blanke and Metzinger, 2009; Gallagher,
2013; Metzinger, 2014; Zahavi, 2014). We have proposed to
organize different components of self-consciousness into two
main categories, roughly equivalent to the influential dichotomy
between “narrative” and “embodied” selfhood. Unlike some
models of the narrative/embodied self-distinction, however, we
have suggested that each of these dimensions can be modulated
by meditation and drugs in different ways, and to different
degrees. The resulting picture can be simplified in the form of a
two-dimensional model of “self-loss” or “ego dissolution,” which
is etiology-independent insofar as both meditation-induced and
drug-induced altered states of consciousness could be located
within this model, and overlap in some cases (Figure 1A).
This two-dimensional model is greatly simplified, because it
suggests that the loss of body ownership, bodily awareness and
self-location are all degrees of self-loss that can be ordered along
the same dimension. Available evidence does suggest that this
14Some narrative reports about 5-MeO-DMT from Erowid.org explicitly refer to
Samadhi practice: “Everything I’ve read about enlightenment and the attainment
of Samadhi makes perfect sense to me now. It has all become so obvious. During
this part of the experience I am not me, I am simply awareness” (#88450),
“an immediate complete dissolution of any identity and a merging into the
oneness, timeless, pure awareness. . . similar in some ways with a previous Samadhi
meditation experience” (#5804).
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FIGURE 1 | Multidimensional models of self-loss in global states of consciousness. (A) A simplified two-dimensional model of self-loss. The X-axis represents the
degree to which multisensory aspects of self-consciousness are disrupted, and the Y-axis represents the degree to which narrative aspects of self-consciousness are
disrupted. The color gradients represent the gradual disruption of narrative aspects (blue), multisensory aspects (red), or both (yellow) within the two-dimensional state
space of altered states of consciousness induced by meditation and psychedelics could theoretically be plotted. This two-dimensional model can be conceived as a
conceptual sketch that reduces the dimensionality of the notion of self-consciousness to two orthogonal principal dimensions, somewhat similarly to Principal
Component Analysis. The shortcomings of this simplified model are tentatively addressed in the more complex (B). (B) A tentative multidimensional model of self-loss.
Global states of consciousness are plotted on the radar chart according to their score on six dimensions (using an arbitrary scale), representing the degree to which
they involve (1) a sense of body ownership, (2) awareness of bodily sensations, (3) awareness of spatial self-location, (4) rich phenomenology, (5) access to semantic
autobiographical information, and (6) self-related thoughts. Regions in the radar chart represent idealized examples of global states of consciousness, including an
ordinary state during wakefulness (dotted black line), two examples of meditation-induced states and two examples of drug-induced states. The region in pink is an
example of a typical meditative state with increased bodily awareness (via attentional focus on the breath), slightly decreased overall phenomenal richness (via
visual-auditory deprivation) and decreased frequency of self-related thoughts. The region in red is an example of a “selfless” state described by experienced
meditators, with a cessation of self-related thought, a loss of body ownership, agency and self-location, and significant reductions in bodily awareness and
phenomenal richness. The region in light green is an example of a state induced by a moderate dose of psychedelic drugs such as LSD or psilocybin, with increased
bodily awareness (modulated by salient and unusual bodily sensations) and increased phenomenal richness (via decreased sensory gating and vivid perceptual
abnormalities). The region in dark green is an example of drug-induced ego dissolution with a loss of narrative and multisensory aspects of self-consciousness, but rich
sensory content. (B) illustrates how even states of “total self-loss” as represented by a single region on (A) can differ from a phenomenological perspective between
meditation (red line) and psychedelics (dark green line). In addition, it shows that some states of consciousness induced by both meditation practice and psychedelics
can also score higher than baseline on certain dimensions of self-consciousness, in particular bodily awareness. Overall, states of “self-loss” are the exception rather
than the norm for both modes of induction. Finally, it should be noted that the phenomenology of altered states induced by meditation and psychedelics may
considerably change over time, sometimes very quickly; consequently, the idealized states plotted on this figure should be considered as phenomenological
“snapshots” at a given time. For example, “Psychedelic state 1” (light green line) could be part of the same drug-induced experience as “Psychedelic state 2” (dark
green line), assuming that the phenomenology dynamically shifts toward the peak of the experience (during the transition to drug-induced ego dissolution).
is often the case: for example, patients with somatoparaphrenia
lack body ownership without lacking bodily awareness and
self-location; individuals undergoing bodiless dreams, asomatic
out-of-body experience and some psychedelic states (e.g., DMT-
induced states) lack both body ownership and bodily awareness,
but not necessarily self-location; and finally full-blown drug-
induced ego dissolution, particularly after administration of 5-
MeO-DMT, appears to involve the loss of all three components.
Nonetheless, as we have mentioned, it is unclear whether
meditation-induced states can involve a complete loss of bodily
awareness (including interoceptive awareness), while it does
seem that they can involve a loss of self-location. Thus, this two-
dimensional model should be considered at most as a helpful
idealization which reduces the dimensionality of the notion
of self-consciousness. A more complex and accurate model
would probably involve more dimensions (Figure 1B; see Bayne
et al., 2016 on multidimensional accounts of global states of
consciousness in general). In our example, we have represented
global states of consciousness within a six-dimensional state
space which models various cognitive and multisensory features
of self-consciousness as independent dimensions (although
systematic correlations are possible). Furthermore, this complex
model takes into account another important variable to identify
phenomenally distinct forms of self-loss, namely the overall
richness or sparsity of phenomenology or the “bandwidth”
of conscious contents. This parameter is relevant because
many drug-induced states, including some of those reported as
instances of drug-induced ego dissolution, have a rich sensory
and emotional phenomenology, contrary to meditation-induced
instances of self-loss. A more sophisticated model could perhaps
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take into account additional parameters, such as the sense
of agency (see the end of section Spatial self-location above).
Meditation-induced states involve intense attentional control at
least during certain stages of the practice, unlike drug-induced
states, although it is not obvious that this always results in
a greater sense of agency in meditation than in psychedelic
states. States of “objectless” or “pure consciousness” which lack
ordinary phenomenal content, such as those induced by Samadhi
practice and perhaps by certain psychedelics like 5-MeO-DMT,
should be represented in the central region of this model,
scoring the lowest in most if not all dimensions. Finally, it
should be noted that “access to autobiographical information”
is not on par with other dimensions of our tentative model,
insofar as it is a functional and dispositional feature rather than
phenomenological feature of conscious episodes. Nonetheless, as
discussed in section Alterations of self-consciousness induced by
meditation and psychedelics, the inability to retrieve semantic
autobiographical information may occasionally be associated
with a specific phenomenology of retrograde amnesia which
differs from the mere cessation of self-related thoughts.
Although we have specifically focused on disruptions of self-
consciousness in this paper, it is important to underline that
both meditation and psychedelics can not only inhibit various
aspects of self-experience, but may also increase their salience in
other cases. In particular, meditation techniques focusing on the
awareness of the breath, as well as psychedelic drugs such as LSD
and psilocybin, may temporarily increase awareness of bodily
sensations. This apparent paradox is resolved when one considers
the many parameters that may modulate the phenomenology of
meditation practice and psychedelic states. As we have insisted,
there are many different styles of meditation, and states of
“self-loss” are usually reported by highly experienced individuals
trained in specific traditions. Moreover, the phenomenology
of a single meditation session unfolds in distinct phases, with
the occasional experience of self-loss being the culmination
of this succession of phase transitions (Yamashiro, 2015; see
Ataria et al., 2015; Dor-Ziderman et al., 2016). Similarly, the
phenomenology of psychedelic states may be modulated by a
number of variables, including: the particular drug used (e.g.,
the effects of 5-MeO-DMT appear to differ from those of other
psychedelics), dosage (high doses being more likely to lead to ego
dissolution), context of use (immobility and sensory deprivation
may modulate the loss of body awareness and self-location) and
finally pharmacodynamics (the effects of a drug evolve across
time, with experiences of self-loss occurring at the peak, if at
all). In Figure 1B, we have represented four examples of global
states of consciousness induced by meditation and psychedelics
to emphasize these nuances. Only two of these states (represented
in red and dark green respectively) may be described as involving
experiences of “total self-loss” as depicted on Figure 1A, although
they do not completely overlap in the multidimensional state
space. We have tentatively summarized in Table 4 below how
such states of self-loss might differ between meditation and
psychedelics.
The upshot of this discussion is that there is no such thing as
“self-loss” or “ego dissolution” in absolute terms. Future research
could develop new tools to assess in a more fine-grained way the
TABLE 4 | Summary of overlap and differences between meditation-induced and





Body ownership – – – – – –
Bodily awareness – – – – –
Self-location – – – – – –
Phenomenal richness + + +
(except 5-MeO-DMT)
– –





features of conscious states described as involving a loss of one’s
sense of self. As an example, neuroimaging studies of psychedelics
have often used a single questionnaire item (“I experienced a
disintegration of myself or ego”) to measure drug-induced ego
dissolution and correlate its intensity with neurophysiological
observations (Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2013; Carhart-Harris
et al., 2014, 2016b; Lebedev et al., 2016; Tagliazucchi et al., 2016).
While this strategy has yielded very interesting results, it does not
allow for the discrimination between several kinds of disruption
of self-consciousness. The recent Ego Dissolution Inventory,
which has been psychometrically validated, does not discriminate
between the loss of narrative and embodied or multisensory
aspects of self-consciousness either (Nour and Carhart-Harris,
2017). Future questionnaires focusing on alterations of self-
consciousness could include both items related to disruptions
of self-related thoughts and mental time travel, and items
related to body ownership, bodily awareness and self-location.
A psychometric analysis of subsequent item ratings could test
whether these items can be grouped into two orthogonal factors,
namely narrative and embodied self-loss.
It is also important to underline that evidence from subjective
reports should be treated with caution. Although the reports
discussed in this paper show a remarkable convergence and can
be treated as preliminary evidence for the disruption of body
ownership, bodily awareness and self-location in meditation
and psychedelic states, alternative interpretations are available.
First, one could refuse to take these self-reports at face value
on the ground that they could be systematically unreliable
and confabulatory. This is rather unlikely, however, given the
convergence of reports from different groups of subjects in
different conditions, as well as the consistency of reports with
questionnaire data. Moreover, there is no reason to suspect
that either meditators or volunteers participating in studies of
psychedelic drugs are particularly prone to confabulation, and
their reports are less problematic than those of patients suffering
from delusions such as the Cotard syndrome (Billon, 2016). In
addition, the microphenomenological interview used to collect
some of these reports is designed to minimize the risk of
confabulation and theoretical contamination (Petitmengin, 2006;
Petitmengin and Lachaux, 2013). Finally, there is some evidence
that meditative experience predicts introspective accuracy (Fox
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et al., 2012; Baird et al., 2014). Nonetheless, it should be noted
that the evidence discussed in this article is still tentative insofar
as most studies of the effects of meditation and psychedelics rely
on a limited sample size.
A second alternative interpretation of the reports discussed
in the previous sections would emphasize that the experience
of loss is not equivalent to the loss of experience. In other
words, the fact that subjects report having a sense of losing
ownership over their body or awareness of their spatial location
does not necessarily entail that body ownership or self-location
were part of their overall phenomenology at baseline (i.e., prior
to meditating or drug administration). While this idea is not
incoherent, we have provided independent reasons to believe
that at least bodily awareness and spatial self-location are part
of the content of ordinary conscious experience; in other words,
there is evidence that we usually experience bodily sensations,
and have some awareness of our relative location with respect
to our perceived environment. While we acknowledge that
the existence of a specific phenomenology of body ownership
is more controversial, we have also mentioned some clinical
and experimental evidence from somatoparaphrenia, autoscopic
phenomena, the rubber hand illusion and full-body illusions
suggesting that some feature(s) of the ordinary experience of
neurotypical individuals are associated with the experience of
one’s body as one’s own.
In order to address the limitations of self-reports, future
research could use implicit and behavioral measurements to
circumvent the risk of introspective biases. For example,
researchers could investigate the representation of trunk-
centered peripersonal space, which has been shown to encode
self-location (Blanke et al., 2015; Noel et al., 2015; Serino et al.,
2015), both during meditation and after psychedelic intake.
A plausible prediction is that the boundaries of the full-body
(trunk-centered) peripersonal space are blurred both during
some instances of drug-induced ego dissolution and some forms
of meditation described as a loss of self-location and body
boundaries (see Millière, 2017).
LONG-TERM OUTCOMES OF ALTERED
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
Selflessness as a Trait
Accumulating evidence shows that meditation’s state effects
linger into daily life, to become long-term, trait alterations
(Cahn and Polich, 2006). These trait effects include alterations
in resting state function or connectivity, as well as structural
changes, compared to control groups (Fox et al., 2014; reviewed
in Tang et al., 2015). A full review of all the accumulated
evidence is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, here
we focus on trait-effects of alterations in self-consciousness,
either from the neurophysiological (underlying mechanisms,
specifically regarding the DMN) or first-person perspective.
Several studies have provided evidence that meditation
practitioners, compared to controls, exhibit reduced resting state
DMN activity and connectivity, either using electrophysiology
(Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2012, 2013) or fMRI (Hasenkamp
and Barsalou, 2012; Berkovich-Ohana et al., 2016). Specifically,
resting state functional connectivity analyses showed that
following 8-weeks of mindfulness-training, participants
demonstrated significantly increased functional connectivity of
the anterior DMN region with the auditory/salience network
(Kilpatrick et al., 2011). Similarly, long-term mindfulness
practitioners showed compared to controls increased functional
connectivity between DMN and visual regions (Berkovich-
Ohana et al., 2016). In other studies, proficient mindfulness
meditators showed increased functional connectivity between
the DMN and fronto-parietal control network compared to
novices (Brewer et al., 2011; Hasenkamp et al., 2012; Taylor
et al., 2013), although there is some evidence of increased
anti-correlation between the DMN and a task-positive network
during focused attention meditation compared to the resting
state (Josipovic et al., 2012), or the DMN and visual regions
following MBSR (Kilpatrick et al., 2011). While fMRI studies
largely show that mindfulness meditation practice is associated
with reduced DMN activity, the related structural effects in
the DMN are less clear (recently reviewed by Fox et al., 2014).
Specifically, several neuroanatomical studies reported changes in
PCC gray matter thickness: while a few studies indicate reduction
in meditators relative to controls (Kang et al., 2013), another
study failed to find group differences (Grant et al., 2013), and yet
another reported gray matter increases following a short 8-weeks
mindfulness meditation intervention (Hölzel et al., 2011). Initial
evidence suggests that such changes in DMN functioning are
indeed related to a reduced tendency to engage in self-referential
processing. One earlier study (Farb et al., 2007) showed that
after an 8-week mindfulness intervention, participants were able
to disengage from a “narrative self-focus” in the trait judgment
task (typically employed to investigate self-referential processes,
cf. Northoff et al., 2006), as evidenced by more pronounced
reductions in the DMN compared to the control group. Similarly,
another study found reduced bias in neural responses to the self
vs. an other’s face for long-term meditators compared to controls
(Trautwein et al., 2016).
Less is known about whether meditation practice affects
multisensory aspects of self-consciousness in a trait-like manner.
Studies investigating neural and phenomenological state effects
of meditation suggest that long-term meditators are capable of
flexibly modulating and reducing bodily self-awareness (Ataria
et al., 2015; Dor-Ziderman et al., 2016). However, controlled
studies have not yet systematically assessed whether this is an
outcome of long-term practice (some effects also seem to occur
in novice practitioners, cf. Dambrun, 2016) and to which degree
such flexibility affects daily life functioning.
There is no evidence that the experience of drug-induced
ego dissolution may have long-term effects on narrative and
multisensory aspects of self-consciousness, such as a reduction of
self-related thoughts. This question may be answered by future
longitudinal studies.
Relation to Therapeutic Outcomes,
Well-Being and Prosociality
While the long-term consequences of ego dissolution on self-
consciousness are uncertain, there is preliminary evidence that
drug-induced alterations of self-consciousness may mediate
therapeutic outcomes. The current model of psychedelic-assisted
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 19 September 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 1475
Millière et al. Psychedelics, Meditation, and Self-Consciousness
therapy originated in the 50’s and 60’s (Pahnke et al., 1971; Dyck,
2006). In this model, subjects receive a high dose of a psychedelic
drug in a supportive environment, with the aim of experiencing
a mystical-type or “peak” experience (Maslow, 1959; Stace, 1960).
This experience is conceived as a “unitive” state involving the loss
of self-world boundaries, as described in sections Alterations of
self-consciousness induced by meditation and psychedelics and
Pure consciousness, non-dual awareness and total selflessness.
The therapeutic model suggests that this experience mediates
long-term outcomes (Pahnke et al., 1971; Grof et al., 2008; Majic´
et al., 2015; Richards, 2015). In recent years, many controlled
studies have shown that that the magnitude of the mystical-
type experience predicts positive psychological outcomes for
depression, addiction, palliative care, and general well-being
(O’Reilly and Funk, 1964; Klavetter and Mogar, 1967; Pahnke
et al., 1971; Kurland and Grof, 1972; Richards et al., 1977;
Griffiths et al., 2006, 2016; MacLean et al., 2011; Garcia-Romeu
et al., 2014; Bogenschutz et al., 2015; Ross et al., 2016; Johnson
et al., 2017; Roseman et al., 2018). Furthermore, a recent analysis
of the psychedelic experience in uncontrolled environments
suggests that mystical-type experiences predict changes in well-
being (Carhart-Harris et al., 2018). It is also suggested that
mystical-type experiences are linked to the positive emotional
outcomes of meditation (Russ and Elliott, 2017).
Two variables appear to predict the occurrence of mystical-
type experience in both meditation and psychedelics: trait
absorption and surrender state. Absorption (Tellegen and
Atkinson, 1974) is a trait characterized by the disposition to have
episodes of “total” attention to one’s representational resources.
Subjects with higher absorption tend to have stronger mystical-
type experiences both under psychedelics (Studerus et al., 2012)
and in meditation (Russ and Elliott, 2017). The second variable
is the pre-experience state characterized by the disposition to
“let-go” or “surrender” to whatever experience comes, sometimes
called “surrender state” (Richards, 2015). This state is not only
related to the subject’s personality but also to interactions with
the environment (e.g., trust toward the therapist). Higher ratings
of willingness to surrender are associated with stronger mystical-
type experience in both psychedelic experiences (Carhart-Harris
et al., 2018) and meditation (Russ and Elliott, 2017).
Do experiences of “self-loss” induced by meditation or
psychedelics have a relevance for therapeutic outcomes or general
well-being? There is preliminary evidence that the therapeutic
effects of psychedelics for treatment-resistant depression is
mediated by meaningful “breakthrough” experiences, which may
include ego dissolution (Roseman et al., 2018). By contrast,
long-term effects of contemplative practices on well-being do
not appear to be necessarily mediated by intense experiences,
but rather by training of different cognitive mechanisms, such
as attentional control mediating meta-awareness of mind-
wandering. Interestingly, one suggestedmechanism is a (gradual)
shift in the perspective on the self-described as “detachment
from identification with a static sense of self ” (Hölzel et al.,
2011). In the Buddhist tradition, this process is thought to be a
crucial factor for the attainment of stable well-being (Olendzki,
2006; Shiah, 2016). Some psychometric research supports this
link (Dambrun, 2017). Moreover, a related construct called
“decentering” has been found to mediate treatment effects of
mindfulness based interventions (reviewed in Bernstein et al.,
2015). Anecdotal reports and traditional sources do also claim
that peak meditative experiences involving a loss of the sense
of self can have lasting effects on well-being (Austin, 2009);
however, perhaps due to the difficulty to induce such experiences
in the lab, they have not been systematically investigated. In
a first qualitative survey on experiences associated with long-
term meditative practice, changes in the sense of self, including
narrative and bodily levels were frequently reported (more than
75%) (Lindahl et al., 2017). Of note, the affective response to these
experiences was not always positive, but ranged “from neutral
curiosity, to bliss and joy, to fear and terror” (p. 20). Interestingly,
ayahuasca administration was also found to produce after 24 h
a significant reduction in judgmental processing of experiences
measured by the Five FacetsMindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ),
as well as a significant increase in decentering ability measured by
the Experiences Questionnaire (EQ) (Soler et al., 2016). Thus, it
is possible that the medium- to long-term effects of meditation
and psychedelic experiences involve a reduced tendency to
be personally and emotionally engaged in one’s thoughts and
feelings, such that “the contents of consciousness are less filtered
through considerations of self-relevance than is usual” (Letheby
and Gerrans, 2017, p. 7).
A further question worth investigating in future research
regards the specific kind of “self-loss,” if any, which may mediate
long-term therapeutic outcome and increased well-being. For
example, are such effects more likely to be mediated by the loss
of narrative or multisensory aspects of self-consciousness? Given
the potential link between mind-wandering and unhappiness
(Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010), it is intriguing to speculate
that increased control of spontaneous thoughts might mediate
increased well-being in experienced meditators, which would
indicate that the disruption of narrative aspects of self-
consciousness may have a positive effect, to some extent.
At this stage, however, this speculative hypothesis remains
unsubstantiated by significant evidence.
Besides individual well-being, one potential outcome of
meditative practice is an increase in empathy and compassion,
which are regarded as antecedents of prosocial behavior. There
is indeed evidence that meditation fosters these aspects of
prosociality (Condon et al., 2013; Ashar et al., 2016; see Kreplin
et al., 2018 for a recent meta-analysis; Leiberg et al., 2011;
Weng et al., 2013). Importantly, it has been hypothesized
that these effects rely on a change in the sense of self. For
example, Dambrun and Ricard (2011) suggested that meditation
can support a shift from self-centered to selfless functioning,
characterized by “a weak distinction between self and others,
and self and the environment as a whole,” which in turn “is
closely related to characteristics such as altruism, kindness,
respect, empathy, compassion and the search for harmony”
(Dambrun and Ricard, 2011, p. 140). Providing evidence for
one part of this relationship, recent studies demonstrated
that manipulation of bodily levels of self-awareness can affect
empathy and social cognition (Maister et al., 2013, 2015).
However, the link to meditation is still largely hypothetical,
although one study found that reduced self-related processing
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in long-term meditators was correlated with increased trait
levels of self-reported compassion (Trautwein et al., 2016).
Intriguingly, the administration of a high dose of psilocybin
1 or 2 months after a program of meditation practice was
found to occasion enduring trait-level increases in prosocial
behavior (Griffiths et al., 2018). This finding raises the question
of whether psychedelic intake may potentiate in certain cases
the putative long-term effects of meditation on prosociality.
In summary, it is possible that there is a link between
“selflessness” as a conscious episode lacking self-consciousness
and trait increase in prosocial behavior, but these two constructs
should not be conflated. Future research could determine
whether such an association exists for meditation training and
perhaps psychedelic use, and get clearer on the mechanisms
involved.
GENERAL CONCLUSION
There is converging evidence that high doses of psychedelic drugs
and certain forms of meditation practice for highly experienced
practitioners can produce strong, short-term, and reversible
disruptions of self-consciousness. However, drug-induced and
meditation-induced experiences of “self-loss” are not uniform,
and can be decomposed in terms of alterations of various
aspects or dimensions of self-consciousness. These include
“narrative” aspects, such as the inhibition of self-related thoughts
and self-related mental time travel, and the loss of access to
autobiographical information, as well as bodily and multisensory
aspects, such as the loss of body ownership, bodily awareness
and self-location. Questionnaire data, subjective reports and
neurophysiological results suggest that some of these aspects
might be independently modulated in the global states of
consciousness that can be induced by meditation and psychedelic
drugs. Thus, the notion of self-consciousness can be construed
as a multidimensional construct, and consequently “self-loss” or
“ego dissolution” should not be conceived as a simple graded
phenomenon ordered along a single dimension.
Moreover, even forms of putative “total” self-loss involving the
radical disruption of both narrative and multisensory aspects of
self-consciousness are best thought of as a family of states which
can differ from a phenomenological perspective with respect
to variables that are not directly related to self-consciousness.
Indeed, strong forms of drug-induced ego dissolution may
involve a very vivid and rich sensory phenomenology, perhaps as
a result of decreased sensory gating, while available evidence on
some “selfless” states induced by meditation suggests that their
phenomenal content is very sparse (e.g., in states of so-called
“pure consciousness” achieved in Samadhi practice).
One potential limitation of this analysis is that empirical data
remains too sparse to reliably determine the phenomenological
and neurophysiological specificity of the global states of
consciousness under consideration. For example, it remains
difficult to assess in what respect conscious states induced by
Samadhi practice really differ from states induced by other
meditation practices or psychedelic drugs. Few controlled studies
have investigated the experience of self-loss in meditation
or drug-induced states, and those which have done so have
limited sample sizes. Another potential issue is the interpretation
of self-reports. It is notoriously difficult to gather reliable
evidence about subjective experience, and this is all the more
problematic with altered states of consciousness often deemed
ineffable.
Future research on this topic could focus on developing
more fine-grained psychometric tools to validate and measure
various dimensions of self-consciousness, and their respective
disruptions in altered states of consciousness. Furthermore,
researchers could seek to correlate reports gathered from
questionnaires not only with neuroimaging data, but also
with independent implicit measurements. As an example,
the disruption of spatial self-location might be associated
with a dissolution of the boundaries of the trunk-centered
peripersonal space, which can be measured using an established
psychophysical paradigm (Noel et al., 2015). Finally, future
research could investigate the possible relationship between
temporary disruptions of self-consciousness induced by
meditation and psychedelics, and long-term changes in cognitive
processing, personality traits and prosocial behavior. While it is
important to avoid conflating states of self-loss with “selflessness”
as a trait or moral construct, it is possible that correlations might
exist between these distinct notions, although perhaps only for
a subset of highly experienced meditators or drug-users. More
research is needed to provide answers to these outstanding
questions.
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